On Point: 6. Restitution

State v. Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 2016AP1541-CR, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion granted 3/14/18; affirmed 1/4/19; case activity (including briefs).

Issue (composed by On Point):

In State v. Queever, 2016 WI App 87, 372 Wis. 2d 388, 887 N.W.2d 912, the court of appeals required a defendant to pay restitution for a security system that the victim bought before the date of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

Must Queever be overturned because it is impossible for a crime committed on a certain date to cause losses on an earlier date? If not, what are the limits of Queever and of the definition of “a crime considered at sentencing” for restitution purposes? Can the definition include alleged prior-committed crimes?

State v. Sara L. Steppke, 2017AP1683, 4/2/18, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Steppke was ordered to pay restitution for a security system her employer installed after she stole $3,000 worth of flea and tick product. The system cost over $16,000–or more than five times the value of what she took. Just a few months ago, a dissenting court of appeals judge lamented that the case law had gotten way, way ahead of the text of the restitution statute itself–giving rise to “entirely unjustifiable” results. One can hope this decision marks the beginning of a return to the plain language of the statute.

State v. Marquis T. Williams, 2018 WI App 20; case activity (including briefs)

Williams, a prison inmate, objected to DOC deducting funds from his prison account to pay the restitution ordered in his criminal case. He asked the sentencing judge to order DOC to stop but the sentencing judge declined. The court of appeals affirms, holding the sentencing court isn’t competent to address that issue. Instead, Williams has to exhaust his administrative remedies using the inmate complaint review system (ICRS) and, if that fails, he can bring a certiorari action in circuit court.

Who would’ve thunk? This is the subject of a hot new paper on the Social Science Research Network.  You can read it here.

State v. David M. Larson, 2017AP1610-CR, 12/27/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

David Larson was driving drunk when another driver, who was cited for failing to yield the right of way, collided with him in a roundabout. Larson drove away while police were investigating. After a contested hearing, the court awarded the other driver restitution for injuries to himself and damage to his car.

State v. Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 2016AP1541-CR, 11/1/17, District 2 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/14/18; affirmed 1/4/19; case activity (including briefs)

“If you start off on the wrong foot, the footer you go, the wronger it gets.” So said Hank the Cowdog and so, essentially, argues the dissenting opinion in this case.  Section 973.20(1r) allows a sentencing court to order a defendant to make full or partial restitution to any victim of a “crime considered at sentencing,” which means “any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any read-in crime.” §973.20(1g)(a). Before ordering restitution, the court must first find a “causal nexus” between the “crime considered at sentencing” and the victim’s alleged damages. Here, the court of appeals finds a “causal nexus” between the lone burglary considered at sentencing and possible losses caused by possible, uncharged prior burglaries that were never considered or read in at sentencing. It does so based upon a series of restitution decisions that have incrementally produced a result the dissent finds absurd.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. Is the imposition of a single mandatory $250 DNA surcharge an ex post facto violation with respect to a defendant who committed his offense when the surcharge was discretionary and who previously had provided a DNA sample in another case?

2. Is Jamal Williams entitled to resentencing because the circuit court sentenced him based on an improper factor, namely, the fact that Williams refused to stipulate to restitution for which he was not legally responsible?

State v. Shaun R. Ezrow, 2016AP1611-CR, 5/25/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The cost a business incurred in enhancing its security system after an employee stole money was a proper item of restitution under § 973.20.

State v. Shawn W. Forgue, 2016AP2414-CR, 5/11/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Forgue, convicted of misdemeanor battery and disorderly conduct, appealed the circuit court’s decision to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior violent conduct toward him (i.e. McMorris evidence) and her other bad acts. He also appealed an order setting restitution at $269.50 for the victim’s lost wages and $1,000 to the Crime Victim Compensation Program.

State v. J.J.S., 2016AP1519, 4/25/17, District 3 (1-judge appeal; ineligible for publication); case activity

The case appears to be an issue of first impression: Whether §938.34(5)(c), which provides that juveniles under 14 can’t be required to pay more than $250 in restitution, refers to the juvenile’s age when the State filed the delinquency petition or the juvenile’s age at the time of disposition. The court of appeals, choosing the time of disposition, upholds the $1,600 restitution award against J.J.S., even though he was just 13 when the filed its petition.