On Point

State v. Roy B. Ismert, No. 2009AP1971-CR, District IV, 7/1/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Ismert: Kristen D. Schipper; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The evidence was sufficient to support the obstructing element that Ismert knew the police officer had legal authority to stop, question and arrest him.

¶14 We conclude that Lossman and Grobstick are persuasive on the facts before us.

2010 WI 61 (Abrahamson, CJ, Bradley, Crooks, JJ); 2010 62 (Prosser, Roggensack, Ziegler, JJ); Judicial Conduct Panel Findings, etc.; WJC Brief; Resp.; WJC Reply

Judicial Discipline – Campaign-Related Misconduct

The court splits 3-3 on whether Justice Gableman’s infamous “loophole” ad violated the Judicial Code. The Chief, et al. (61 bloc), say it did:

We three,

State v. Joshua D. Conger, 2010 WI 56, on certification; for Conger: Anthony L. O’Malley; Brief (State); Brief (Conger); Brief (Judge Grimm); Reply (Conger); Amicus (Prosecution Project, UW)

Plea Bargain – Rejection

A circuit court has post-arraignment authority to reject a proposed plea bargain that would result in amendment to the charge; State v.

Docket

Decision below (CTA8)

Questions Presented:

There is a conflict among the United States Courts of Appeals regarding a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation and whether it can support a downward sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Whether a federal district judge can consider a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation as a permissible factor supporting a sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) after Gall v.

Sears v. Upton, USSC No. 09-8854, 6/29/10

United States Supreme Court decision

The state court concluded that in this death penalty case, counsel failed to conduct more than a cursory penalty-phase investigation (and thus failed to determine that Sears suffered significant frontal lobe damage and had endured significant childhood abuse). However, the state court also concluded that it couldn’t find prejudice because counsel adduced some mitigation —

State v. Timothy Charles Bauer, 2010 WI App 93; for Bauer: Catherine M. Canright; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Search-Incident – Automobile

By failing to address Bauer’s Arizona v. Gant argument, instead relying solely on State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 174, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), the States’ argument compels the court to reverse the suppression order:

¶9 Here,

State v. Justin H., No. 2009AP2935, District III, 6/29/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Justin H.: Leonard D. Kachinsky

¶9 However, even assuming Justin properly preserved a due process argument, we reject it.  Due process principles require that a juvenile against whom a delinquency petition has been filed be given “notice … sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings … set[ting] forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.” State v.

Sheboygan Co. DHHS v. Tanya M.B. / William S.L., 2010 WI 55, reversing unpublished court of appeals decision; for Tanya M.B.: Paul G. Bonneson; for William L.: Thomas K. Voss

CHIPS order entered under § 48.355(2)(b)1 “shall contain … specific services to be provided”; subsequent TPR based on lack of compliance with CHIPS conditions requires that the responsible agency made a reasonable effort to provide the ordered services.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, USSC No. 08-1521, 6/28/10

Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. ___ (2008), we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. The city of Chicago (City) and the village of Oak Park,

court of appeals decision; pro se; Resp. Br.

Sentence Modification – DNA Surcharge

¶2        Singleton was sentenced on July 24, 2002, and the circuit court ordered, as a condition of his bifurcated sentence, that Singleton provide a DNA sample and pay the applicable surcharge.[1] Singleton’s sole challenge is made via a motion to modify his sentence under Wis. Stat. § 973.19 (2007-08), and is addressed only to the adequacy of the court’s explanation for imposition of the surcharge under Cherry,