On Point

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication) BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Traffic Arrest
Probable cause to believe Broad drove on public roadway, hence to arrest for OWI, where car was found off the road, Broad was in driver’s seat and admitted to being driver, car “was warm and running.”

Right to Testify
Violation of rule requiring contemporaneous colloquy as to waiver of right to testify at trial doesn’t lead to automatic reversal of conviction;

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication) BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Terry Stop
Reasonable suspicion found, based on citizen informant report of pickup truck slowly going back and forth down a residential street at 3:30 in the morning and “approaching various houses”; “lawful but unusual and suspicious driving may be the basis of an officer’s reasonable suspicion.”

State v. Travis Joe Brimer, Jr., 2010 WI App 57; for Brimer: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

“The right against self-incrimination only applies at criminal proceedings or “other proceeding … where the answers might incriminate [the defendant] in future criminal proceedings.” Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986) (citations omitted),” ¶7. Because a reconfinement hearing isn’t part of the criminal process,

State v. Dionny L. Reynolds, 2010 WI App 56; for Reynolds: Russell D. Bohach; BiC; Resp. Br.

Statement voluntary, following multiple interviews while in custody on unrelated offense:

¶45      Balancing Reynolds’ personal characteristics against the totality of the police detectives’ conduct, we note, first and foremost, that Reynolds voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making his incriminating statement. Generally speaking,

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); Susan E. Alesia, Madison Appellate

Competency
Circuit court erred in not granting request for competency hearing, based on some jibberjabber about the PD and cost; plus circuit court wrong to limit competency hearing to those few cases where person “doesn’t have a clue what’s going on.”

(Snark: who bears costs when the court doesn’t have a clue what’s going on?) Trial counsel,

decision below: 2009 WI App 156; for Carter: Craig M. Kuhary

Issues:

Do violations of Illinois’ zero tolerance (absolute sobriety) law count as prior offenses for sentence enhancement purposes under Wisconsin’s Operating While Intoxicated (OWI) Law (Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63 and 346.65)?

What methodology are trial courts to employ in determining whether to count out-of-state OWI-related offenses for sentence enhancement purposes under Wis. Stat. § 343.307?

7th Circuit decision

Habeas – Procedural Bar

… If a state court clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar and does not reach the merits of a federal claim, then we are unable to consider that claim on collateral review. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989); Pole, 570 F.3d at 937. And we have repeatedly explained that where a state court reviews the claim for plain error as the result of a state procedural bar such as the Illinois doctrine of waiver,

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); BIC; Resp. Br.

Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion
Stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, given trial court findings that “Johnson’s vehicle crossed the fog line and drifted across the lane to the area of the center line, weaved from the right to the left while negotiating curves in the road, moved close enough to the center line on a curve to cause concern that it might collide with an oncoming vehicle,

7th Circuit decision

Terry Stop / Frisk
1. Pulling up in a patrol car and telling Gentry to keep his hands up amounted to a stop for purposes of Terry analysis.

2. The stop, which was based on a report of a “suspicious person,” without reference to any specific facts concerning a crime, was not supported by reasonable suspicion to believe Gentry had either committed a crime or was armed.

court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); Resp. Br; Reply Br

Exculpatory Material
Defense had access to assertedly suppressed exculpatory material, hence no Brady violation.

Effective Assistance
Counsel had valid tactical reason for cross-examination approach; failure to file discovery demand, object to certain testimony: “The defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice. … Walker has not even attempted to do so.