On Point

Dane Co. DHS v. Jennifer F., 2011AP530, District 4, 6/9/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Jennifer F.: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Although the trial court erred in not taking testimony in support of no-contest pleas to the TPR petition as required by § 48.422(3) (see Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶56, 233 Wis.

State v. Francis A. Malsbury, 2010AP3112-CR, District 2, 6/8/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Malsbury: Andrew R. Walter; case activity

Prior conviction, in Washington state in 1999 for reckless driving amended from driving under the influence, qualified as a prior OWI and therefore subjected Malsbury to criminal prosecution.

¶7        We hold that Malsbury’s Washington reckless driving conviction counts as a prior conviction for purposes of Wisconsin’s accelerated OWI penalty structure.  

State v. Henry W., 2011AP693, District 1, 6/7/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Henry W.: Jane S. Earle; case activity

Testimony of a “bonding expert” as to how the child’s view of her father would make it difficult for him to meet conditions of return, was relevant and admissible in the grounds phase, ¶¶5-7, 10.

Trial court’s refusal to grant adjournment of dispositional phase so that father could secure his own bonding expert,

County of Brown v. Eric J. Schroeder, 2010AP2967, District 3, 6/7/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Schroeder: Dennis M. Melowski, Dennis M. Melowski; case activity

Following OWI arrest and blood test result over the limit, Schoeder’s license was administratively suspended. The police, however, failed to provide him with the form explaining the suspension review process, contrary to § 343.305(8)(am). Schroeder argues that this omission causes a loss of presumptive reliability of the blood test (which allows admission into evidence without expert testimony).

Estate of Brianna Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc., 2011 WI App 101

court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); case activity

¶24 n. 7:

On page 36 of its brief responding to Excel’s main appellate brief, E&B asserts:  “[n]ot a single non-Kriefall [Pierringer] settlement agreement” is in the Record.  That is not true, as Excel’s reply brief points out.  

State v. Deundra R. Lathan, 2011 WI App 104 (recommended for publication); for Lathan: George S. Tauscheck; case activity

Consent to Search, Co-Occupant

Consent to search premises given by one occupant overrides refusal to consent by co-occupant when neither is the subject of the search or ensuing arrest (resolving question expressly held open by Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 n.

McNeil v. U.S., USSC No. 10-5258, 6/6/11

Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a prior state drug-trafficking conviction is for a “serious drug offense” if “a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law” for the offense. 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The question in this case concerns how a federal court should determine the maximum sentence for a prior state drug offense for ACCA purposes.

Docket

Decision below:  Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2010)

Question Presented:

Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first postconviction proceeding, has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.

On Point is very pleased to present this guest post discussion of Skinner v. Switzer by Brandon L. Garrett, Professor of Law, University of Virginia. Professor Garrett’s most recent book, “Convicting the Innocent,” was reviewed by in the New York Times Sunday Book Review 5/26/11.

The U.S. Supreme Court settled another boundary dispute about what lies inside and what lies outside of habeas corpus today in Skinner v.

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Retroactive Application of Case Law, on Collateral Review

Narvaez’s federal ACCA enhancement, imposed in 2003, is now unsupportable in light of subsequently-decided Supreme Court authority (Begay v. U.S.; Chambers v. U.S.). He may therefore seek relief against the sentencing enhancement via 28 U.S.C. § 2255: the case law development worked a change in “substantive liability”