On Point

State v. Jeremy D. Pinnow, Milwaukee Co. Circ. Ct. No. 2010CM1978, 2/11/11

circuit court decision; case activity

Carrying concealed weapon charge dismissed, under as-applied (state) constitutional challenge, Art. I § 25. Pinnow had a cased, unloaded gun underneath the seat of his car, had himself been the recent victim of an armed robbery, believed with reason he was transporting the gun in a lawful manner, and wasn’t carrying the gun for an unlawful purpose.

Pepper v. U.S., USSC No. 09-6822, 3/2/11

In light of the federal sentencing framework described above, we think it clear that when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range.

The thrust of the opinion is statutory,

State v. Kelly J. McCredie, 2010AP1179-CR, District 2, 3/2/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for McCredie: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

For purposes of 3rd-degree sexual assault, § 940.225(3), the actor cannot obtain consent by deceiving the victim as to his true identity. McCredie misled the victim into thinking he was his brother (she was sleeping in a dark room when he suddenly appeared;

FCC v. AT&T, USSC No. 09-1279, 3/1/11

The “personal privacy” exemption in the federal Freedom of Information Act doesn’t apply to corporations, though they are considered “persons” under the Act.

… Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own. The noun “crab” refers variously to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” can refer to handwriting that is “difficult to read,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 527 (2002);

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Eric A.:  pro se; case activity

Expungement – Delinquency Adjudication, § 938.355(4m)(a)

Denial of petition for expungement of repeated sexual assault of child adjudication is affirmed.

¶8        Here, the court determined that the offense was too serious, and it would be against public policy, to permit expungement.  The court’s order stated society would be harmed by granting expungement. 

State v. Winston B. Eison, 2011 WI App 52; for Eison: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Preservation of Issue – Motion in Limine

Eison objected to introduction of evidence of his arrest on an unrelated offense via motion in limine, which the trial court granted. At trial, however, the court allowed the State to introduce this evidence. Eison didn’t need to lodge additional objection to preserve the issue for review.

Michigan v. Bryant, USSC No. 09-150

At respondent Richard Bryant’s trial, the court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who discovered him mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot. … We hold that the circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis,

Walker v. Charles W. Martin, USSC No. 09-996, 2/23/11

State court time limit for seeking postconviction relief needn’t be “fixed,” but instead may be discretionary in nature, for purposes of the habeas default rule.

In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___ (2009), this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the merits despite the default.

State v. Derek J. Copeland, 2011 WI App 28; for Copeland: David Leeper; case activity

Trial court has discretion under § 906.15(3) to order an attorney not to discuss with a sequestered witness who hasn’t yet testified the testimony of other witnesses; this authority extends to barring counsel from providing the sequestered witness with a transcript of prior-witness testimony. The trial court in this instance misperceived a lack of such authority,

State v. Robert S. Powless, 2010AP1116-CR, District 3/4, 2/24/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Powless: Leonard D. Kachinsky; case activity

At an evidentiary hearing on a “Hampton” violation (failure to assure defendant knows the judge isn’t bound by the plea agreement), the State satisfied its burden of proving that Powless in fact knew the judge could exceed the State’s sentencing recommendation.

¶37      Our conclusion is based on the following.