State v. T.R.T., 2025AP387-CR, 6/19/25, District IV (not recommended for publication); case activity
Although it acknowledges uncertainty as to the appropriate standard of review, COA ultimately affirms the circuit court’s order under a clearly erroneous standard.
After concerns were raised about T.R.T.’s competency, the circuit court ordered an examination and scheduled a hearing to address two questions: “(1) whether T.R.T. was incompetent (the “competency determination”); and (2) if so, whether there was a likelihood that T.R.T. could, with treatment, be restored to competency within twelve months (the “restorability determination”).” (¶4).
At the hearing, the Court faced dueling experts. The court-appointed examiner, Borra, opined that T.R.T. was actually feigning incompetency and did not offer an opinion as to restorability. (¶5). In contrast, the defense expert (Benson) opined that T.R.T. was incompetent and could not be restored within the statutory timeframe. (Id.). In addition to harshly cross-examining Benson, the State also called one of T.R.T.’s jailers in an attempt to rebut some of Benson’s findings about T.R.T.’s deficits by eliciting the jailer’s observations of T.R.T.’s “demeanor.” (¶11).
Interestingly, the circuit court then found both experts credible. (¶12). It found T.R.T. incompetent and stated it was giving “more weight” to Benson’s opinion on this matter, although it also faulted the doctor for not conducting malingering tests. (Id.). And, despite finding T.R.T. incompetent, the court appeared to keep open the possibility that T.R.T. was malingering. (Id.). However, the court rejected Benson’s opinion as to restorability, and relied instead on reports from the jail “which suggested that the neurocognitive impairments might not be as profound as Benson believed.” (¶14). T.R.T. appeals the restorability finding.
Standard of Review
On appeal, the parties disagree as to the standard of review to be applied to the court’s restorability finding. Canvassing US Supreme Court and federal courts of appeal decisions, the State urges COA to use a deferential clearly erroneous standard. (¶21). In contrast, T.R.T. analogizes to Chapter 51 case law to argue that this is a question of fact independently reviewed on appeal. (¶20).
COA holds that the issue is resolvable based on SCOW’s decisions in State v. Garfoot and State v. Byrge, both of which establish that the circuit court’s finding regarding a defendant’s competency is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. (¶22). While these cases do not directly address the restorability criterion, COA observes that “restorability was at issue in Garfoot, and the majority did not suggest that a standard other than clearly erroneous should apply to restorability.” (¶23). It rejects T.R.T.’s attempts to draw a distinction between the incompetency and restoration questions for the purposes of applying a standard of review and holds that it would create possible conflict with Byrge to do so here. (¶26). Accordingly, COA holds that the clearly erroneous standard is the correct one to apply in this case. (Id.).
Review of Trial Court’s Decision
Having determined that an exceedingly deferential standard of review applies, COA easily affirms the lower court’s decision: “Here, as shown above, supra ¶¶12-14, the court’s determination was based on evidence that was presented at the hearing, and the court provided reasons for its determination that are logical and consistent with the record facts.” (¶27). Although T.R.T. makes a number of well-articulated attacks on the court’s decision, these attacks are insufficient to overcome the imposing standard of review and COA affirms.