Racine County v. D.S. 2025AP758-FT, 8/6/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects a battery of challenges to D.S.’s involuntary commitment and medication despite sharing some of the examining physician’s “concerns” about her situation.
According to the cover sheet of this opinion, the circuit court case for this matter originates in 1990. COA therefore observes that “Donna has a lengthy treatment history and has been involuntarily committed since 2006.” (¶2). This appeal stems from a February 2025 recommitment hearing. (Id.). At that hearing, Dr. Marshall Bales opined that Donna satisfied the second, third, and fourth standards of dangerousness in connection with the recommitment standard. (¶¶5-7).
On appeal, Donna challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both the commitment and medication orders:
Evidence of Dangerousness–Second Standard
Here, COA agrees with Donna that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the second standard. (¶18). While Dr. Bales claimed that Donna had historical issues with “aggression,” COA holds that “general allegations of past aggressive behavior fall short of the specific, factual findings which are necessary to support a finding of dangerousness.” (¶19). And while Bales referenced an incident where Donna allegedly threw silverware while confined at her current placement, COA faults the County for not eliciting specific details about that incident which would enable it to assess whether that conduct satisfies the statutory standard. (Id.). It also refuses to consider a memorandum prepared by the case manager which was not admitted into evidence. (Id.).
Evidence of Dangerousness–Third and Fourth Standards
However, COA agrees with the circuit court that the overall record supports a finding of dangerousness under the third and fourth standards. (¶20). Donna made statements evincing she did not need medication, displayed symptoms of a mental illness, and also made statements suggesting she was incapable of living on her own (telling the examiner all she needed was an apartment, money, and a soda pop.). (¶22). “Taken together, this evidence was sufficient to establish, under the third standard, that if her treatment were withdrawn, Donna would not continue to medicate voluntarily and, as a result, would exhibit ‘impaired judgment’ that would give rise to ‘a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to … herself ….'” (¶23). “Similarly, under the fourth standard, Bales’ report and the hearing testimony established that, if Donna’s treatment were withdrawn, her mental illness would leave her unable to satisfy her basic needs and give rise to a substantial probability of ‘death, serious physical injury, serious physical debilitation, or serious physical disease ….'” (Id.).
Pointing to her lengthy history under Chapter 51, Donna avers that she is not a proper candidate for such orders and that her situation is more suited to orders under Chapters 54 and 55. (¶24). Relying on Kelly M., she claims the County should have been required to explain why this alternative set of orders would have been insufficient. (Id.). COA is unpersuaded and holds that Donna has misread the applicable case, as it does not believe “that before a determination of dangerousness under the third and fourth standards can be made, a petitioner must show that placement or services under a guardianship is unavailable or insufficient. Nor did Kelly M. establish, despite Donna’s assertions, that the County would bear the burden of establishing the same.” (¶25). In any case, COA also observes the issue is being raised for the first time on appeal and it can ignore it for that reason, as well. (Id.).
Medication Order
Essentially, Donna claims that the explanation of side effects provided was insufficient and that Bales did not clarify in his testimony the specific drugs he discussed with Donna. (¶29). COA disagrees that this renders the evidence insufficient: “Although Bales did not specifically testify that he addressed each medication with Donna, it is reasonable to infer from his report and testimony that he did so. Moreover, though there may be more adverse side effects associated with the medications than are listed in Bales’s report, this court does not believe that it would be appropriate to require examining physicians to discuss with involuntarily committed individuals every side effect that has ever been associated with a particular medication.” (¶30).
COA is, however, concerned by Bales’s testimony, where he actually admitted he was “alarmed” that Donna’s medication had not been changed in years. (¶31). Bales actually tried to contact the treatment provider, who ignored him, and even testified that he would propose a different medication regimen. (Id.). While COA indicates that this may be an issue under at least one reading of Melanie L., as the evidence seems clear that Donna only received an explanation of her existing medication regimen and not the regimen proposed by the examiner, COA is satisfied that this explanation of the current medication regimen–notwithstanding Dr. Bales’s articulated concerns about that regimen–was statutorily sufficient and affirms. (Id.).