Crawford County v. M.W., 2025AP302, 8/14/25, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
Despite concluding that M.W.’s plea colloquy was “lacking in certain respects” on the circuit court’s part, COA holds that the record supports the court’s postdisposition conclusion that M.W. knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his admission. COA also rejects M.W.’s arguments that the county failed to establish a factual basis and that trial counsel was ineffective.
The child, J.J.D., was removed from her mother’s care at the hospital shortly after her birth, and was declared a child in need of protection and services (“CHIPS”). (¶2). She remained with foster families throughout this case. M.W. had not been aware of the pregnancy, and learned of J.J.D.’s birth two days after it occurred. (¶3). He soon moved to Illinois.
The county filed a petition to terminate both of J.J.D.’s parents’ rights. (¶4). As grounds for M.W., the county alleged continuing CHIPS, and failure to assume parental responsibility. See Wis. Stats. § 48.415(2), (6)(a). At a hearing on the grounds phase, trial counsel for M.W. informed the circuit court that he wished to enter a plea of admission that grounds existed for the termination of his parental rights, though he would continue to contest termination at disposition. At disposition, the court determined that it was in J.J.D.’s best interest that M.W.’s parental rights be terminated. (¶5).
M.W. then filed a postdisposition motion. (¶6). The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing at which M.W. and his trial counsel testified. As in his postdisposition motion, M.W. argues on appeal that his plea of admission was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; the court failed to elicit a sufficient factual basis for his plea of admission; and his trial counsel was ineffective in relation to his plea of admission. (¶10).
As to whether his admission was KIV, M.W. M.W. that the colloquy failed to: (1) set forth the “best interests of the child” standard that would apply at the disposition phase; (2) lay out the possible outcomes at the dispositional phase; (3) inform M.W. that he would be found an “unfit” parent if his admission plea were accepted; and (4) establish that no threats or promises had been made to M.W. to induce his admission. (¶19). When a circuit court’s colloquy is inadequate, the parent may seek to withdraw the admission if the parent alleges a lack of understanding of the information that should have been communicated. Brown Cnty. DHS v. Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, ¶57, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730. If a parent makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the admission was nevertheless knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id., ¶36.
First, COA finds that the circuit court did inform M.W. of the “best interest” standard. (¶20). Second, COA upholds the circuit court’s “implicit factual determination . . . that M.W. was aware” of the possibility of dismissal of the petition because his trial counsel testified that she had discussed it with him. (¶¶21-22). Third, while the court did not inform M.W. that he would be found unfit as a parent, it did tell him that the case would proceed to disposition and his rights could be terminated. Further, during his testimony at the postdisposition hearing, M.W. testified that he understood that after entering his plea of admission, the court would find him unfit as a parent. (¶23). Fourth, the court did not ask M.W. whether anyone had made threats or promises to induce his admission. However, at the postdisposition hearing, M.W. did not suggest any such promises or threats had been made, and his trial counsel testified that none had. (¶24).
COA next concludes that there was a sufficient factual basis to support M.W.’s admission. To accept a TPR plea of admission, Wis. Stat. § 48.422(3) obligates the circuit court to hear testimony in support of the allegations in the petition. However, the COA must examine the record and determine whether sufficient facts were adduced throughout the proceedings as a whole to support the grounds. Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶58, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607. Here, although “M.W. accurately observes that the court did not take testimony at the fact-finding hearing at which he entered his admission[,]” COA searches the record and determines that sufficient facts were presented throughout the proceedings as a whole to support the grounds. (¶27).
Last, COA rejects M.W.’s ineffective assistance argument as undeveloped. M.W.’s briefs apparently do “not identify any specific acts or omissions by counsel which render counsel deficient” but “states only that the ‘advice given to him and the failure of his attorneys to ascertain that M.W. understood the consequences of his . . . admission’ constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.” (¶29).