Brown County v. M.J., 2025AP116, 8/26/25, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
In a Chapter 51 appeal presenting familiar legal challenges, COA avoids some of the stickier legal issues on a path toward affirmance.
Dangerousness
In this recommitment action, “Max” was found dangerous under the third standard, in conjunction with § 51.20(1)(am). (¶13). Max argues that much of the evidence used to establish dangerousness was hearsay and therefore cannot be relied on to satisfy the County’s burden. (¶15). Max runs into several issues. First, he did not challenge the admission of the hearsay below. (¶15). Second, he “cites no case law indicating that hearsay cannot support a finding of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.” (Id.). Third, his hearsay argument is in tension with the plain text of § 51.20(1)(am), which “appears to expressly allow the consideration of hearsay evidence [in the form of treatment records].” (¶16). Having dispensed with his efforts to do away with the damaging hearsay evidence, COA disagrees with “Max’s characterization of the evidence presented at the hearing as containing only ‘assumptions,’ ‘hypotheticals,’ and ‘conclusory opinions.'” (¶17). In COA’s view, there were sufficient factual references, based on this record, to support the ultimate conclusions of the examiner. (¶20). “Specifically, there is evidence that Max has struggled in the past and, more importantly, continues to struggle with his medication, that he deeply dislikes the injectable form of medication he is currently receiving, and that he does not consistently take his oral medications. Further, Max needed to be hospitalized in the year preceding the hearing due to medication refusals. When off his medication, he engages in “aggressive” behaviors and struggles with basic hygiene, such that he does not shower, mold grows in his room, and he picks at his face, possibly causing infection.” (Id.).
While COA therefore makes some critical comments suggesting the County could have done a better job, it ultimately concludes the evidence met the statutory threshold here. (Id.).
In a lengthy footnote, COA highlights an interesting legal issue it ultimately does not need to resolve. Here, Max refused to meet with the examiner. Accordingly, the examiner was “forced” to rely on medical records. It notes that if Max is correct that those medical records cannot be used to establish his dangerousness, it will have created an incentive for respondents to “skip” the court-ordered examination and deprive the County of evidence needed to commit them. This argument would have made this case a more interesting than usual 51 appeal, but COA ultimately holds it does not need to reach it given the existence of other sufficient evidence in the record.
Medication
Max obtains a minor victory when he persuades COA the County failed to prove he was incapable of “expressing” an understanding on this point. (¶23). Citing his prior medication refusals and ongoing “dissonance between Max’s stated understandings and his conduct in terms of avoiding the the very dangers to himself caused by his mental illnesses, for which he is a proper subject for treatment.” (¶26). Accordingly, COA agrees that he is incompetent to refuse medication. (Id.).