Wood County v. J.A.B., 2025AP220, 8/21/25, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA reversed the circuit court’s order for protective placement because the County did not establish that J.A.B. was so totally incapable of providing for her own care as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to herself or others.
At the hearing on Wood County’s petition for protective placement on behalf of J.A.B., the County’s only witness was Erin Knetter, a protective service coordinator for the County. Knetter testified that she provided social work services to J.A.B. during her prior protective placement but had not worked with her for two years. She said J.A.B.’s guardian reported that J.A.B. continued to drink alcohol during those two years and, on one occasion, became “highly intoxicated” at her neighbor’s residence and needed to use a walker to get back to her apartment because she was incapable of walking. (¶ 9). Ms. Knetter said, within the last year, law enforcement transported J.A.B. to a medical center to treat her alcoholism because officers felt that she was unsafe when they observed her with multiple lacerations and bruising after fighting with her neighbors. However, J.A.B. was sent home to care for herself after she sobered up. (¶ 10).
Knetter testified that, in the two years since J.A.B.’s prior protective placement terminated, she was evicted from two residences due to her alcohol use and received a notice of infractions that could lead to eviction from her current apartment. (¶ 11). Knetter said J.A.B. required in-home services but protective services were insufficient because J.A.B. did not allow people into her home. Knetter also said J.A.B. did not have the ability to “do anything independent, to clean her home or stop her alcohol use.” (¶ 12). If she was evicted from her apartment again, Knetter testified, the County did not have a residence in which to place her due to her prior evictions. (¶ 12).
On cross-examination, Knetter acknowledged she had not visited J.A.B. at her current residence and did not know its present condition. She also said J.A.B. received services from Lutheran Social Services and was attending all appointments and accepting all in-home services. (¶ 13).
The circuit court also considered reports from two psychologists. Dr. Starr said J.A.B. had a history of alcohol abuse and schizoaffective disorder and was not “able to properly care for herself.” (¶14). Specifically, Dr. Starr noted that she struggled with eating, sleep, and hygiene and had numerous contacts with law enforcement due to noise complaints and physical altercations with neighbors. However, Dr. Starr said J.A.B. did not refuse her prescribed treatment and medications. (¶ 14). Dr. Starr determined J.A.B. required protective placement because she was “at significant risk and vulnerable” and that a less restrictive measure was not appropriate because she had a history of non-compliance and had been unable to remain sober outside of a facility. (¶ 15).
Dr. Benson diagnosed J.A.B. with “serious mental disorders and neurocognitive deficits due to multiple etiologies, including chronic alcohol abuse.” (¶ 16). However, Dr. Benson said J.A.B. had abstained from alcohol since March 30, 2024 (the hearing was held in June 2024), and was able to independently dress herself, use the bathroom, use a phone, prepare her meals, and do her laundry. (¶ 16). Dr. Benson reported that J.A.B. relied on Lutheran Social Services for assistance with housekeeping and shopping. (¶ 16). Dr. Benson considered J.A.B. at risk for manipulation and exploitation by others due to her cognitive deficits, which warranted a need for guardianship but not protective placement because she was able to live independently and with support from her guardian and Lutheran Social Services. (¶¶ 16-17).
The circuit court found that J.A.B. met the criteria for protective placement because her alcohol use would become a “permanent, probably vegetative disability” if she did not stop drinking. (¶ 19). The circuit court also found protective placement justified because J.A.B. continued to fight with neighbors, needed help getting around her apartment, and did not allow people into her apartment. (¶ 19).
The Court agreed with J.A.B.’s argument that the County did not meet its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was so totally incapable of providing for her own care and custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to herself or others, as required for protective placement under Wis. Stat. § 55.08(1)(c). The Court noted that the County needed to identify a specific, foreseeable, and serious harm and that the risk of harm was substantial. (¶ 20).
The Court did not consider J.A.B. refusing to let people into her apartment sufficient to establish a serious risk of serious harm because there was no evidence regarding the specific harm that would result by J.A.B. refusing to allow people into her home. (¶ 21). With respect to J.A.B. fighting with neighbors, the Court observed that neither Starr nor Knitter explained how these fights put her or others at risk of serious harm and that minor accidents, injuries, and illness are not sufficient to satisfy the standard established by Wis. Stat. § 55.08(1)(c). (¶ 22).
With respect to J.A.B. needing help with cleaning her apartment, the Court found that the evidence did not establish how requiring assistance with cleaning lead to a substantial risk of serious harm. (¶ 23). The Court did not consider Dr. Starr’s report that J.A.B. was unable to maintain a safe living environment in her home to provide enough detail to establish a specific overt act or act of omission to create a substantial risk of serious harm, which was required by Wis. Stat. § 55.08(1)(c).
The Court considered speculative the circuit court’s finding that J.A.B.’s alcohol use would lead to permanent disability because the record did not contain evidence of specific, foreseeable harm that would result from J.A.B. continuing to drink alcohol. (¶ 24).
Regarding J.A.B.’s potential eviction, the Court found that the witnesses did not identify specific, foreseeable, and serious harm that would result if she were evicted. And Dr. Starr’s report that J.A.B.’s struggles with eating, sleep, and hygiene were “vague assertions” that do not establish a substantial risk of serious harm. (¶ 25). The Court considered J.A.B.s’ risk for manipulation and exploitation by others “concerning,” but “they are vague and do not describe ‘overt acts or acts of omission’” that create a substantial risk of serious harm. (¶ 25).
The County argued that J.A.B. was “essentially asking this court to reweigh the evidence as if the court of appeals were the circuit court.” (¶ 26). But the Court rejected the County’s argument because the court of appeals reviews de novo whether the evidence supports protective placement. (¶ 26).
This case demonstrates the importance of the standard of review on appeal. Had the Court reviewed for sufficiency of the evidence where the COA gives deference to the circuit court’s credibility determinations and evaluation of the evidence, such as in appeals from chapter 980 commitments, the County might have prevailed on its argument that J.A.B. was asking the Court to place itself in the circuit court’s role by reweighing the evidence.