COA rejects hearsay and D.J.W. challenges to ch. 51 commitment
Grant County v. T.L.M., 2025AP500, 8/28/25, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
T.L.M. challenges her recommitment, arguing that the circuit court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence over her objection, and that the court failed to make the required factual findings to support the commitment. COA concludes that although the circuit court erroneously admitted some hearsay, the error was harmless, and that the circuit court satisfied the demands of Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.
T.L.M. challenged aspects of the doctor’s testimony and the admission of his report as hearsay. As the doctor testified that T.L.M. had told him the facts he testified to, the court concluded it was not hearsay. Although T.L.M. argues that the psychiatrist’s testimony went further than the statements she made, COA rejects the argument because it “cannot determine what facts or details T.L.M. did or did not convey to the psychiatrist during the interview.” (¶13). As to the doctor’s report, the circuit court stated it was admitting it for the limited purpose evaluating the doctor’s opinions and not for the truth of the matters asserted within the report. Therefore, COA concludes the report was properly admitted. (¶14).
T.L.M. also challenged the admission of an emergency services supervisor’s report, which “was the product of entries by employees at the community services agency” and “anybody … working on the file can input information in that document.” (¶15). The circuit court admitted it as a record of regularly conducted activity under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6). COA agrees with T.L.M. that this report contains multiple levels of hearsay:
The report at issue here contains information that, on its face, was recorded by employees of many different organizations spanning multiple counties and states over the course of more than 20 years. The fact that the County’s community services agency obtained and compiled all of this information from these other sources does not bring it within the business records exception.
(¶16). COA rejects the circuit court’s secondary reasoning for admitting the report–the residual hearsay exception, § 908.03(24), “[g]iven that the document contains dozens of assertions made by employees of multiple organizations over two decades—many of them unattributed to any particular source[.]” (¶17). However, COA concludes that the error was harmless because the court’s “remarks focused on the dangerous acts T.L.M. had recently and undisputedly engaged in, as well as her recent threats to harm herself—all of which were proved by admissible non-hearsay evidence.” (¶18).
T.L.M. next argued that the circuit court failed to make sufficient factual findings to support the recommitment order. COA finds that the circuit court’s comments were “brief” but “convey[ed]” that it was relying on recent instances of T.L.M. jumping from high places, and her recent threats to harm herself. (¶22). COA also rejects T.L.M.’s argument that the circuit court failed to address the recommitment standard, (am), to any specific factual findings, as these recent acts occurred while she had been under commitment and involuntary medication orders, and the doctor testified that her treatment did not seem to be working. (¶23). It concludes that “the circuit court was justified in entering the order finding that T.L.M. would be dangerous to herself if treatment were withdrawn” and “the court satisfied the mandate in D.J.W.” because “of the straightforward evidence in this case.”