SCOTUS’s most recent order list includes impassioned dissent regarding juror impeachment rule
In an interesting dissent from an order denying cert, three justices join together to decry the rigorous application of the juror impeachment rule in a case that resulted in a verdict of death.
Stacey Humphreys was charged with numerous serious felonies following a double homicide. One of the jurors, Chancey, admitted that during voir dire that she had been a prior victim of a crime but deliberately withheld details about that crime which mirrored some of the details in this case. Worse, she apparently lost it during deliberations:
She yelled, cursed, and screamed that she would “stay [t]here till forever if ” that is what it took “for [Humphreys] to get death.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. She threw the victims’ photos across the table and demanded, “‘[D]o you want this to happen to someone you know?’” Ibid. She reminded the jurors of the similar details of her own attack, and told them that “‘they had to reach a unanimous decision or [Humphreys] would be paroled,’” which was not true under Georgia law. Ibid. She then levied personal attacks against the jurors and refused to engage in any debate.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, jury deliberations almost completely broke down. Screaming could be overheard from the courtroom. One juror “‘took a swing’” at Chancey and punched a hole in the wall. Ibid. Jurors were seen crying on several occasions. A juror later recalled that “it was as if an evil force took over . . . Chancey.” ECF Doc. 33–12, p. 13. The foreperson even wrote a note asking to be removed from the jury because of the “‘hostile nature of one of the jurors.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a.
These facts only came to light after Humphreys was eventually sentenced to death. Thus, while these facts establish a likely Sixth Amendment violation, the issue is that the state of Georgia, like many other states (including Wisconsin) has a rule forbidding the admissibility of testimony about juror deliberations.
While the dissenters admit the case is mired, as many cases are, in the weeds of habeas review, the case also contains an important reminder that such no-impeachment rules must yield to the demands of the Sixth Amendment:
The rule, however, is not without limits. This Court has long recognized that the rule has exceptions in the “gravest and most important” cases. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U. S. 264, 268–269 (1915). Indeed, there “may be cases of juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been abridged.” Warger v. Shauers, 574 U. S. 40, 51, n. 3 (2014). “If and when such a case arises,” courts should “consider whether the usual safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process.” Ibid.