COA approves ban on social media as condition of extended supervision in a decision recommended for publication.
State v. Jonathan James Petersen, 2024AP581-CR, 11/19/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The COA recommended publication of its decision to affirm a ban on social media as a condition of extended supervision for a defendant convicted of stalking, false imprisonment, and making terrorist threats.
Jonathan James Petersen pled guilty to stalking, false imprisonment, and making terrorist threats – all with a dangerous weapon. The victim impact statement alleged that Petersen found her social media accounts and said “harmful things about me on there.” When she blocked his account, he made a new account and would “do it again.” (¶ 3). The circuit court ordered “no social media” as a condition of extended supervision. (¶ 4).
Trial counsel did not object to the conditions of extended supervision, but Petersen filed a postconviction motion asking to modify the ban on social media to allow him to use it with agent approval. He argued the condition was overly broad because the State did not allege that Petersen used social media to plan or execute criminal activity. The State disagreed and cited the complaint that alleged Petersen showed up where the victim worked after she blocked him on social media and he “put things on social media about her.” (¶ 6). The circuit court denied the motion because Petersen created fake social media accounts and posted comments on social media to harass one of the victims. (¶ 7).
Petersen argued on appeal that the condition violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The COA recognized that a condition of extended supervision may limit a constitutional right provided the condition is not overly broad and is reasonably related to the person’s rehabilitation. (¶ 11). Peterson argued the condition is overly broad because the circuit court also imposed a “no contact” condition of supervision and therefore the social media condition only protected a “handful” of victims. (¶ 12). The COA considered Petersen’s interpretation of the condition as too narrow: “[A] circuit court ordering conditions of supervision must consider not only the particular victims in the case before it, who were affected by a defendant’s past wrongful conduct, but also society as a whole, in order to protect potential future victims. The court’s ‘no social media condition in this case comports with these considerations.” (¶ 13). The COA did not consider the ban on social media overly broad because it was necessary to prevent Petersen from harassing members of the public in addition to the victims. (¶ 14).
Nor did the COA view the no-contact provision as overly broad with respect to the victims of the offense because the no-contact provision did not prevent Petersen from making “harmful” comments about the victims on social media. (¶ 15). The Court also found that the ban on social media could benefit Petersen’s rehabilitation by encouraging him to conform “his conduct by preventing him from beginning a stalking or harassment social media campaign against future victims.” (¶ 16).
Petersen argued the condition was unrelated to the offense because he did not use social media to plan or execute any criminal activity. The Court was unpersuaded because a condition of supervision need not be related to the defendant’s wrongful actions in a particular case. (¶ 17). Further, the Court considered Petersen’s use of social media “part and parcel of his campaign of harassing” the victim when he said “harmful things about her there.” (¶ 17).
Finally, the Court left open the possibility that Petersen could seek to modify the ban on social media by, for example, requesting access to certain social media sites to aid him in future employment opportunities. (¶ 18 n.6).