On Point

Defense win: COA reverses order continuing protective placement

La Crosse County and S.A.A. v. M.A., 2025AP269, 10/30/25, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity

In yet another protective placement win, COA agrees that the County’s evidence failed to satisfy the standards and reverses.

M.A. raises two sufficiency challenges following his annual review of the underlying protective placement order:

Primary Need for Residential Care and Custody 

At this annual review hearing, the petitioner needed to prove that M.A. had a “primary need for residential care and custody” which is defined as a “primary need (1) to have … daily needs provided for in a residential setting; and (2) to have someone else exercising control and supervision in that residential setting for the purpose of protecting the person from abuse, financial exploitation, neglect, and self-neglect.” (¶15).

Here, the primary evidence came from an examining psychologist, who testified that M.A. (who is mentally ill) had a “fundamental inability to meet his basic needs and ensure personal safety on his own.” (¶16). He also referenced a risk of financial exploitation. (Id.). However, despite uttering the correct magic words in his testimony, COA faults the witness for failing “to provide specific evidence that would support” his conclusory assertions. (¶¶17-18). The doctor failed to sufficiently identify and explain which needs were going unmet and is also faulted by COA for filing a “vague” report. (Id.). Accordingly, COA finds the evidence insufficient with respect to this element.

Substantial Risk of Serious Harm

The petitioner also needed to prove that, due to his mental illness, M.A. is “so totally incapable of providing for his … own care or custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to himself … or others.” (¶20). To meet the standard, the petitioner needs to offer more than mere speculation and instead needs to specifically prove the existence of foreseeable and serious harm. (Id.). 

The petitioner failed to do so here, as it relied again on the deficient testimony of the examining psychologist, who was never even “asked whether M.A.’s disability rendered him so incapable of caring for himself as to pose a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or others.” (¶21). While the witness did describe dangerous conduct that occurred when M.A. was not medicated, that testimony is insufficient for two reasons. First, at least one of the alleged incidents is very dated and the others lack any detail as to their timing. (¶22). Second, testimony about the way in which M.A. would become dangerous if unmedicated is answering a different question; it does not prove the need for protective placement. (Id.). The remaining testimony–about a messy house or association with unsavory acquaintances–is vague and insufficient to demonstrate the requisite level of harm. (¶24).