Defense Win: COA reverses order extending involuntary commitment.
Trempealeau County v. S.K., 2025AP645, 11/4/25, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA reversed the circuit court’s order to extend “Sharon’s” involuntary commitment. Although the County presented evidence that Sharon would stop taking medication to treat her schizophrenia if she were not committed, the evidence to support her current dangerousness was conclusory.
Sharon was involuntarily committed in 2009 after she ran in front of a moving vehicle and was nearly hit. The circuit court found that she suffered from schizophrenia and authorized involuntarily administering medication and treatment. (¶ 2).
Sharon’s commitment was extended annually from 2009 to 2024 and a hearing on Trempealeau County’s most recent petition to extend her commitment was held in November 2024. A psychiatrist testified that Sharon shows minor “residual” symptoms of schizophrenia but is “well treated” on her current medication. (¶ 4). The psychologist said when Sharon is “acutely symptomatic,” she experiences hallucinations, delusions, thought disorganization, and erratic behavior and that these symptoms presented a potential safety risk to Sharon in the past when she was nearly hit by a car in 2009. (¶ 4). The psychologist said Sharon does not recognize that she has a mental illness and does not believe she needs medication. He said it was “highly unlikely” Karen would take medication if her commitment were not extended, which would cause a “substantial risk” she would decompensate “with an increased risk of dangerousness.” (¶ 5).
Sharon’s former case manager testified that Sharon does not believe she has a mental illness or that she needs medication. Sharon told her former case manager she would not voluntarily take medication; the case manager said Sharon remains “dangerous” due to her impaired judgment and belief that her children are in danger. (¶ 7).
A Trempealeau County social worker testified that she did not believe Sharon would take medication if she was not committed based on her recent conversation with her. If Sharon’s commitment were not continued, the social worker said, she would engage in behavior that could require another commitment. (¶ 8). A nurse who treated Sharon testified that she did not understand the benefits of medication. (¶ 9).
The circuit court extended Sharon’s commitment pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and 51.20(1)(am) because, although there was no evidence she is currently “dangerous,” she would be in need of another commitment if the extension was not authorized because she denied her need for medication. (¶ 10).
Section 51.20(1)(a)2.c. authorizes involuntarily committing a person who is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous because the person “[e]vidences such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or herself or other individuals.”
Recognizing that an individual’s behavior might change while receiving treatment, § 51.20(1)(am) provides that dangerousness for a person that was the subject of treatment immediately prior to the extension hearing “may be satisfied by a showing that there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual’s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” However, each extension hearing requires proof of current dangerousness. (¶ 12).
The COA agreed with Sharon’s argument that the County did not prove it was much more likely than not that she would physically harm herself or others if treatment were withdrawn. While the County presented evidence that Sharon would stop taking her medication if the commitment were not extended, it did not “present clear and convincing evidence to support the finding of Sharon’s dangerousness under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. in conjunction with § 51.20(1)(am).” (¶ 15).
The COA noted that the psychiatrist did not specify the types of dangers Sharon might encounter or provide examples of how Sharon would be dangerous to herself or others if she were not committed such as hurting herself, not eating or drinking, losing her home, or being unable to care for herself. (¶ 16). The Court considered the County’s evidence conclusory by “merely stating that an individual would be ‘dangerous,’ without evidence explaining the ways in which the individual would be dangerous,” which is insufficient to extend an involuntary commitment order. (¶ 16). Because there can be no involuntary medication order without a commitment order, the COA also reversed the order authorizing involuntary medication and treatment.