In case involving unique application of “once waived, always waived” COA holds that “previous violation” doesn’t mean a violation that occurred previously
State v. A.A., 2025AP1907, 11/10/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
In a case involving a unique waiver posture, COA concludes that the circuit court correctly interpreted the statutes when it used a waiver decision in another county to exempt A.A. from juvenile jurisdiction.
A.A.’s delinquent conduct, involving carjacking and other crimes, began in Racine County but ended in Kenosha County. (¶2). Both counties filed delinquency and waiver petitions. (¶3). Although the Kenosha County conduct occurred after the Racine County conduct, Kenosha acted first and entered an order waiving jurisdiction. (Id.). As a result, the Racine County prosecutor argued that the Racine County juvenile court had lost jurisdiction under § 938.183(1)(b). (¶4). The circuit court accepted that interpretation and denied A.A.’s motion seeking to keep the case in juvenile court. (Id.).
Here, the text of the statute makes clear that criminal, not juvenile court, has jurisdiction over:
[a] juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law if … the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and [WIS. STAT.] ch. 48 has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation and criminal proceedings on that previous violation are still pending.
(¶6).
A.A.’s argument is straightforward, and focuses on the language which states that, for a prior waiver order to preclude juvenile court jurisdiction, that order must be for a “previous violation.” (¶9). Under his reading, A.A.’s conduct in Kenosha County, which occurred after his Racine County conduct, cannot be, from the perspective of the Racine County allegations, a “previous violation.” (Id.). Accordingly, A.A. argues that this is an exception to the otherwise broad principle of “once waived, always waived” discussed in State v. Hinkle (which did not address this timing argument). (Id.).
COA seemingly agrees with A.A. that Hinkle does not govern the resolution of this appeal and therefore conducts its own plain text analysis. (¶10). COA also agrees that its interpretation of the word “previous” is the key to resolving this appeal. (¶11). It relies on the following dictionary definitions:
- “[G]oing before in time or order.”
- “Coming or going before (in time or order); foregoing, preceding, antecedent.”
- “Existing or occurring before something else in time or order[.]”
(Id.) (citations removed).
Accordingly, COA holds that the phrase “previous violation” in the statutes refers “to an infraction or breach of the law that comes or occurs before another violation for which waiver is sought, either in time or order.” (Id.) A.A.’s interpretation, which relies solely on the timing and order of the conduct, is therefore rejected:
In his view, WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(b) would only mandate adult court jurisdiction if a prior waiver pertained to a violation that occurred earlier in time. But he points to no language in paragraph (1)(b) or elsewhere in § 938.183 that supports this narrower interpretation of “previous violation.” He asserts that “subsequent” conduct cannot logically be a “previous violation.” This court disagrees: a “previous violation” can simply be one for which a waiver has already been granted, regardless of the chronological order of the underlying conduct.
(¶12). This interpretation is also consistent with the broad language used by the Hinkle court. (¶13). Accordingly, COA affirms.
Looking at the text of the statute, the legislature could have cleaned all of this up by simply omitting the phrase “previous violation.” Instead, the text of the statute indicates that a prior waiver will only have preclusive effect if that order was “for” a “previous violation.” COA has effectively read out the relationship between these two phrases, holding that subsequent conduct can become a previous violation if it results in a prior waiver order. Moreover, although its own plain text reading relies on timing and “order,” COA resists any argument that chronological order or the basic realities of our metaphysical systems of thought govern its statutory interpretation.