COA clarifies “serious crime” factor in involuntary med challenges; rejects challenges to treatment plan and affirms
State v. B.M.T., 2025AP1745-50, 11/21/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
In this appeal from an involuntary medication order, COA provides additional guidance as to how the “seriousness” of a crime is determined and rejects a challenge that the medication plan was insufficiently individualized.
B.M.T. appeals from orders for involuntary medication entered followed a finding of incompetency under § 971.14. As usual in these case types, this is a factually dense opinion. Therefore, we’ll focus on the holdings relevant to our readings:
Standard of Review
COA begins by observing that the standard of review applicable to appeals raising a Sell challenge remains unsettled, with three prior cases all refusing to weigh in on the issue. (¶27). COA takes the same tack here, noting in a footnote that the issue might be resolved soon in the pending J.D.B. appeal presently before SCOW. (Id.).
Whether the State Has an Interest in Bringing B.M.T. to Trial for a “Serious Crime.”
Under Sell, the first factor for determining the proprietary of an involuntary medication order assesses whether “the State has an important interest in proceeding to trial.” (¶23). Here, B.M.T. acknowledges that two of twenty charges he faces in these cases–battery by a prisoner (a class H felony) and substantial battery as an act of domestic abuse (Class I)–are “serious crimes.” (¶29). However, he maintains that the State has not proven a significant interest in bringing him to trial because the remaining eighteen charges are insufficiently “serious.” (Id.). Although the State presses for a categorical rule that the mere issuance of a “serious” charge will be sufficient to satisfy this first Sell factor, COA ultimately holds that is not necessary to adopt that rule here. (¶32). According to COA, “B.M.T.’s concession, coupled with other aspects of the various criminal cases, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the State has an important—perhaps even compelling—interest in bringing B.M.T. to trial.” (Id.). COA focuses on “the alleged violence permeating B.M.T.’s criminal history,” as well as the “sheer volume” of charges, which shows “an individual who is allegedly incapable or unwilling to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” (¶34). Accordingly, COA holds that a court may properly consider the entire “panoply” of alleged conduct before it in determining the State’s interest in prosecution. (¶36).
Whether Special Circumstances Exist that Lessen the State’s Interest in Prosecution
Here, B.M.T. argues that the potential for involuntary mental commitment under Chapter 51 or the potentially successful assertion of an NGI defense diminish the State’s interest in criminal prosecution. (¶38). However, B.M.T. has an ample history of prior Chapter 51 commitments and B.M.T. fails to persuade COA that “a future commitment will accomplish what previous commitments could not.” (¶39). Moreover, the fact that some portion of that hypothetical civil commitment could be outpatient also favors the State’s interest in criminal prosecution. (¶40). COA therefore distinguishes the facts of this case from its recent decision in J.D.B., holding that the possibility of a Chapter 51 commitment is “uncertain and speculative.” (¶41). COA likewise finds the possibility of successfully asserting an NGI defense equally “uncertain and speculative.” (¶42). Finally, COA declines to address the State’s victim’s rights argument, holding that it is unnecessary to do so here. (¶43).
Treatment Plan was Sufficiently Individualized
Although B.M.T. challenges specific aspects of the treatment plan, COA holds that “[t]he treatment plan authorized by the circuit court is not a generic treatment plan lacking any nexus to B.M.T.” (¶47). Although COA agrees that the record is sparse in spots, overall, COA’s overall review of the record shows that the State met its burden. (¶51). Relying on its recent decision in D.E.C., COA holds that the State is not required to provide “a listing of each and every medical consideration or procedure that a testifying psychiatrist may testify about.” (Id.). The “totality of the evidence” demonstrates that the circuit court made its decision based on a “medically informed record.” (¶56). Moreover, COA also faults B.M.T. for not adequately developing at least one of his arguments via cross-examination below. (¶53). Even though the burden is on the State, this does not “absolve the defendant from creating an evidentiary record that supports an appellate challenge.” (Id.).
Given the complex nuances of the legal challenges in this niche practice area, we admit that we’ve generalized quite a bit in trying to bring out the main holdings of COA’s lengthy opinion. Obviously, litigators grappling with this issue will need to carefully review this latest precedential development, which, at least to our eyes, appears to be a further retraction from the sweeping defense win in J.D.B. And, as in D.E.C., we see an interesting interpretation of the burden of proof issue. While most trial attorneys would probably believe it is best to shut up and say nothing when the State appears to be making a deficient record, here, COA appears to suggest that those attorneys have at least some obligation to develop the record so as to substantiate later sufficiency challenges on appeal.