COA rejects challenge to circuit court’s exercise of discretion on disposition determination
Marquette County DHS v. J.J., 2025AP1963, 1964 & 1965, 12/18/25, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
J.J. stipulated to the existence of grounds for termination but contested disposition. He now appeals the orders terminating his parental rights to three of his children, arguing that the circuit court erred because it based its termination decision in part on his poverty. COA concludes that the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion and affirms.
J.J. and his wife have six children together, and all six were removed in 2021 before being returned. (¶3). The three youngest children were removed again in 2023. (¶4). In 2024, the county filed petitions to terminate both parents’ rights to the three children, citing reoccurring concerns about the unsafe physical condition of the home and neglect of the children, and alleging that the children continued to be in need of protection or services. Both parents entered admissions to the continuing CHIPS ground. (¶5). After the evidentiary hearing on disposition, the circuit court terminated J.J.’s parental rights. The court discussed each of the factors, and commented on the parents’ finances during its consideration of the sixth factor. Specifically, the court stated, “They have $3,400 a month income, and $2,250 goes towards rent alone. In the Court’s view, that is a significant portion. That only brings into, at least, concern that may devolve again….” (¶¶7-9).
J.J. does not claim that the circuit court failed to consider any of the mandatory factors, but takes issue with the court’s discussion of the sixth factor–“[w]hether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of the termination, taking into account the conditions of the child’s current placement, the likelihood of future placements and the results of prior placements.” WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(f). He contends that the court’s discussion of this factor demonstrated unsound reasoning about his poverty, which rendered its dispositional decision erroneous. (¶12). COA rejects J.J.’s argument that courts may not base a termination decision even “in part” on the poverty of the parents, holding that there is no “broad[ ] proposition that a parent’s financial situation can never lawfully factor into a court’s decision about what is in the best interests of the child.” (¶¶13-14).
COA also rejects J.J.’s other arguments that the circuit court made determinations about the parents’ financial situation that were not supported by information on the record and concludes that the court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. (¶¶15-22).