On Point

Defense win: COA reverses Chapter 51 order and finds County did not prove current dangerousness

Portage County v. T.W.P., 2025AP1183, 11/26/25, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity

In a case involving a commitment order originating in “2008 or 2009,” COA finds that the County failed to prove that T.W.P. is currently dangerous and therefore reverses.

T.W.P., who is schizophrenic, was initially committed in 2008 or 2009; however, the appellate record contains scant facts about that original order. (¶2). This appeal stems from 2024 recommitment proceedings. (Id.). On appeal, T.W.P. alleges that the County failed to prove dangerousness.

Here, there are two standards at play, the third and the fourth, as modified by the recommitment standard. (¶16). To support its request for yet another extension order, the County relied on the usual chain of inferential reasoning: “that if he were not subject to continuing commitment, he would not take his medication, and that if he did not take his medication, he would engage in dangerous behavior that he has not evidenced during the time he has been committed.” (¶17). Although the County concedes there has been no indication of “outwardly dangerous” conduct since 2008 or 2009, it argues that T.W.P. lacks insight and, because this lack of insight will lead him to cease medication, this will result in

a high chance his symptoms would worsen, creating a situation in which one or both of two situations would arise: T.W.P. would (1) have such impaired judgment that there would be a “substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to [T.W.P.] or other individuals,” WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.; and/or he would (2) be “unable to satisfy [his] basic needs for nourishment, medical care, shelter or safety” creating a substantial possibility that “death, serious physical injury, serious physical debilitation, or serious physical disease [would] immediately ensue,” § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.

(Id.).

Ultimately, however, COA resolves the case by narrowly focusing on the evidence that T.W.P. will not avail himself of medication, labeling that evidence “ambiguous” on this point. (¶19). In this context, given the extraordinary passage of time, “nonspecific” allegations that T.W.P. was not consistent in taking medication prior to the court orders in 2008 or 2009 is insufficient. (¶20). Moreover, T.W.P.’s comments to the examiner about medication–including “legitimate” complaints about side effects–“is not strong evidence that he would refuse any appropriate medication if given the choice.” (¶23). COA also finds the evidence that T.W.P. would become dangerous “attenuated” and agrees that his very dated conduct from the 2000s is insufficient to establish his present dangerousness. (¶25). And, while the County attempted to rely on generic and conclusory assertions that T.W.P. would not care for himself, COA faults the County for not presenting evidence to back up these claims. (¶28). Accordingly, it reverses the order continuing T.W.P.’s commitment.