COA expresses skepticism about window tint argument and upholds OWI stop
State v. Joseph M. Heroff, 2025AP684-CR, 12/23/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA applies general reasonable suspicion principles to uphold a stop based on overly dark tint, holding that the officer’s testimony was sufficient and that he did not need to articulate any specific expertise as to the legal tint percentage.
Heroff’s vehicle was stopped because of a suspected tint violation. (¶3). The officer testified that it was “almost impossible” to see through Heroff’s rear window and, as a result, he believed Heroff was violating the tint law. (Id.). On appeal, he renews his challenge to this stop. He relies chiefly on COA’s published decision in Conaway, where COA rejected a stop as unreasonable when that stop was based on a mere belief that the driver had “dark window tint” without accompanying proof that the officer was able to distinguish between lawful and unlawful tint levels. (¶12).
COA, however, finds Conaway distinguishable. Here, the officer did more than make a bald assertion that the window appeared overly dark; instead, he made a particularized claim that he was actually unable to see inside the car as a result of the tint level. (¶13). A photograph of the tinted window, admitted as evidence at the suppression hearing, corroborates the officer’s claim as to the “extreme” nature of the tint level. (Id.). Considering this evidence, further testimony about the officer’s experience with window tint levels was unnecessary. (¶14). Given the low bar for reasonable suspicion, COA holds that there was enough evidence to support the initial seizure and affirms the trial court’s order denying the suppression motion.