On Point

COA relies on testimony from initial commitment hearing and judicial notice of CCAP records to affirm ch. 51 recommitment

Columbia County v. T.R.B., 2025AP1972, 1/8/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity

T.R.B. argues on appeal that the dangerousness evidence at the recommitment hearing was inadmissible hearsay, that the circuit court relied on that inadmissible hearsay in making its factual findings, and that with the hearsay evidence properly excluded, the county did not present sufficient evidence of his dangerousness. COA rejects his challenges, concluding that there was sufficient nonhearsay evidence in the record but looking to testimony from the initial commitment and taking judicial notice of outside facts.

COA begins by summarizing the initial commitment proceedings in significant detail, seemingly because it later relies on those proceedings to conclude that the county met its burden to show dangerousness in this recommitment. It appears that T.R.B. was increasingly delusional leading up to the three-party petition filed by his family members in 2023. T.R.B. was detained and placed at Winnebago Mental Health Institute. (¶2). He initially entered into a stipulation, but later went to a final hearing. In the meantime, T.R.B. picked up criminal charges due to an alleged physical altercation with his father, as well as alleged threats to kill his parents. (¶¶3-4). He was diagnosed with schizophrenia. At the final hearing on the initial commitment, two doctors and T.R.B.’s mother testified.

At the recommitment hearing, the county called three witnesses, the court appointed examiner, T.R.B.’s case manager, and the community support program director. The examiner testified based on her 30-minute examination of T.R.B., interviews with the program director and T.R.B.’s mother, and review of T.R.B.’s records. T.R.B. objected to the introduction of the doctor’s report and the director’s “petition letter” into evidence on hearsay grounds. The circuit court overruled both objections and then made factual findings, specifically referencing the doctor’s report. (¶22).

First, COA rejects T.R.B.’s argument that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting the report and letter because they contained inadmissible hearsay. It concludes that the documents were properly admitted because they were ” highly relevant and necessary for the court’s determination of whether T.R.B.’s commitment and medication orders should be extended.” They also both contained T.R.B.’s statements and the writers impressions of T.R.B., which are not hearsay. (¶¶34-35).

Next, COA addresses T.R.B.’s arguments that the circuit court erred when it made factual findings based on hearsay, and without that hearsay, there was insufficient evidence as to dangerousness. (¶36). It concludes that the circuit court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, and there was sufficient evidence of dangerousness in the record. COA states, “To be sure, there was admissible evidence which could have been referenced to provide a more compelling and robust set of factual findings to further support a determination of dangerousness.” (¶37).

In finding the evidence was sufficient, the court “infer[s] that Dr. Taylor’s statements in her report about T.R.B.’s past dangerous conduct on which the circuit court relied are derived from T.R.B.’s own statements, the criminal charges that resulted, and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from T.R.B.’s treatment history, all of which are admissible.” COA takes judicial notice that T.R.B. had four separate criminal cases pending. (¶38). The court then relies on T.R.B.’s mother’s testimony at the original commitment hearing as the basis for some of the circuit court’s factual findings. (¶¶39-40). Accordingly, the court concludes that “there was additional admissible evidence in the record which supports Dr. Taylor’s statements cited by the court in its factual findings which sufficiently support the court’s dangerousness determination.” (¶40).

COA next applies the harmless error test to the circuit court’s factual finding that T.R.B. had threatened to kill his parents, seemingly acknowledging that the only source of this information is hearsay. It finds the error was harmless because there is not a reasonable possibility that it contributed to the outcome here.  (¶41). Finally, the court concludes that the director’s testimony also supported the outcome because it demonstrated that T.R.B. continued to have delusional thinking and did not believe he had schizophrenia. (¶¶42-43).