Defense win: COA holds that court erroneously granted partial summary judgment in TPR
Chippewa County v. C.F., 2025AP1744, 1/21/26, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
C.F. appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her son, arguing the circuit court erred by granting the county’s motion for partial summary judgment as to grounds. COA agrees that the order denying her visitation did not give adequate notice of the conditions she needed to meet in order to be granted visitation.
“Cynthia’s” son, “Kevin” was placed outside her home in a CHIPS proceeding. (¶2). At the county’s request, the circuit court later suspended Cynthia’s visitation with Kevin “until further order of the [c]ourt.” (¶¶3-5). The order contained a notice concerning the grounds on which parental rights may be terminated, which listed the potential ground as continuing CHIPS. (¶5).
The county filed a petition to terminate Cynthia’s parental rights to Kevin, alleging that grounds for TPR existed due to continuing denial of periods of physical placement or visitation. It then moved for partial summary judgment as to grounds, arguing that the fact of Cynthia’s continuing denial of periods of physical placement or visitation was established by the circuit court’s revision order, which had been in effect for over one year at the time the TPR petition was filed. (¶6). Cynthia opposed the motion, raising the issue of the conditions for reinstatement, but the circuit court granted partial summary judgment after a hearing. (¶¶7-8). The court held a dispositional hearing and terminated Cynthia’s parental rights to Kevin. (¶9).
Cynthia’s appellate counsel first filed a n0-merit report, which COA rejected. (¶10). In her merits appeal, Cynthia argues that the circuit court erred by granting partial summary judgment because the revision order did not adequately set forth the conditions for reinstatement of Cynthia’s visitation rights with Kevin, and that the court’s dispositional order placing Kevin outside of her home did not adequately warn her that the TPR ground ultimately sought by the county was one of the grounds “most applicable” to her. (¶11).
The circuit court granted partial summary judgment on the continuing denial of periods of physical placement or visitation ground under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4). This ground requires two elements, the first of which–“[t]hat the parent has been denied periods of physical placement by court order in an action affecting the family or has been denied visitation under an order under” one of the listed statutes “containing the notice required by [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.356(2) or 938.356(2).” The court’s grant of partial summary judgment was improper because the revision order did not contain adequate notice of the conditions Cynthia was required to meet to reinstate visitation with Kevin. The order referenced a separate document—a memorandum the county filed in the CHIPs action in support of its request to revise Cynthia’s visitation—that contained the conditions for reunification. (¶¶16-18).
COA assumes without deciding that incorporating by reference to another document satisfies the notice requirement, but concludes that the documents here still did not provide adequate notice because the county’s memorandum listed the conditions of reunification, not visitation. COA further notes that if the first condition provided by the county—“[t]hat [Cynthia] … shall have regular, appropriate, and consistent visits and contact with [Kevin]”—were a condition necessary for Cynthia to be granted visitation, it would have been impossible for her to meet this condition. (¶18). COA also concludes that the language the county used in its memorandum is “vague and unspecific.” (¶19).