SCOTUS applies emergency aid exception to warrant requirement “without further gloss;” declines to adopt probable cause standard
Case v. Montana, USSC No. 24-624, 1/14/2026, affirming Montana v. Case, 2024 MT 165, 417 Mont. 354, 553 P.3d 985; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
SCOTUS unanimously holds that Brigham City v. Stuart‘s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render aid applies “without further gloss” and was satisfied here. While SCOTUS affirms the Montana Supreme Court’s judgment, the Court does not adopt the lower court’s reasoning in full.
(Our post on the cert grant is available here).
William Case’s girlfriend called 911 and reported that Case had told her over the phone that he was going to kill himself, he sounded erratic, and she tried to talk him out of it, but he said he was going to leave a note. She heard noises that sounded like he prepared to shoot and then shot a gun. (pp.1-2). Police responded to Case’s home where they knocked and yelled, but got no response. (p.2). They could see a notepad with writing on it and an empty gun holster inside, so they entered the house to prevent injury or render aid. (pp.2-3). Case was hiding in an upstairs closet when an officer entered the room, and Case emerged holding “a black object” that looked like a gun. The officer shot Case and he was taken to the hospital. (p.3).
Due to this incident, the state charged Case with assaulting an officer. The trial court denied Case’s motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the home entry, which argued that police violated his Fourth Amendment rights. A jury later found Case guilty. On appeal, a divided Montana Supreme Court held that the entry was lawful under the state’s community caretaker doctrine. (p.3).
SCOTUS granted certiorari “because courts have differed on whether police officers entering a home to provide emergency aid need ‘probable cause’ to believe that an occupant is in peril.” (p.4). The Court concludes that the probable cause standard, which Case urges the Court to apply, is inapt. (p.4). SCOTUS instead holds “just what we have held before: that the officers may enter if, but only if, they have an ‘objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that an occupant faces serious danger. (pp.4-5) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006).
The Court summarizes the development of this exception, starting with Brigham City, then Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009), in which it reiterated the “emergency aid exception,” and finally Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021), in which it reaffirmed Brigham City but rejected a broader “community caretaking” justification for warrantless home entries. (pp.5-7). Thus, the Court critiques the Montana Supreme Court’s use of certain terms. First, Montana’s use of the term “community caretaker” doctrine is potentially confusing, as SCOTUS rejected that lower bar in Caniglia. Second, Montana’s use of the language that a home entry is “reasonable” when an officer has “specific and articulable facts” from which to “suspect” that someone needs help in its test because the language evokes the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion test. (p.7).
SCOTUS also rejects Case’s request to clarify that the emergency aid test is equivalent to probable cause. The Court reasons that the probable cause standard is particularly related to criminal investigations and is not a good fit outside that context. (p.8). The Court then applies the Brigham City test and concludes that the officers here were justified in entering Case’s home. (pp.9-10).
Justice Sotomayor concurs, writing separately to emphasize the “unique considerations that law enforcement and courts should bear in mind when assessing whether there is an ‘objectively reasonable basis to believe’ that a person experiencing a mental-health crisis needs law enforcement to ‘render emergency assistance.'” (p.1). When officers respond to a possible suicide, it may not always be objectively reasonable for law enforcement to enter a house to “preserve life or avoid serious injury.” Law enforcement may escalate rather than ameliorate the situation, putting everyone in more danger. The prevalence of guns increases this risk. (p.2). People with serious mental-health conditions are “disproportionately likely to be injured and seven times more likely to be killed during police interactions…” (p.3). The “manner” in which officers enter a home must also be “reasonable.” (p.4).
Justice Sotomayor also notes that this case highlights those complexities, as multiple facts suggested Case did not need emergency aid but was attempting “suicide-by-cop.” (p.4). For example, the officers involved knew that Case had attempted “suicide-by-cop” before. These facts “tended to undermine the officers’ basis to believe that [Case] needed emergency assistance inside.” However, the justice agrees that there were sufficient facts to suggest that Case had shot himself and needed emergency assistance, and that therefore the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered his home. (p.5). But, “[t]hat conclusion, on the facts of this case, does not mean it will always be objectively reasonable for officers responding to a mental-health crisis to make a warrantless entry.” (p.5).
Separately, Justice Gorsuch concurs to muse on the question of whether the reasonableness standard for the emergency aid exception is “directly ‘tied to the law[.]'” (p.1). Justice Gorsuch reasons that “courts have historically held that property rights give way to concern for human safety.” His concurrence goes on to consider Fourth Amendment privacy protections in light of common law principles. (pp.2-3).