A belated Seventh Circuit update
We know it has been quite some time since we checked in with the Seventh. Mostly, that’s because the pace of the Court slowed down quite a bit toward the end of the year. We wanted to make this post more substantive, so we’ve combined the last few months into one update. As usual, we’ve tried to focus on cases with potential relevance to state court practitioners and thereby omit several interesting cases about federal procedure or federal statutory interpretation:
October 2025:
United States of America v. Jaison L. Coleman, No. 24-3051: Police responded to a 911 call reporting domestic violence at the Coleman home in Marshfield, Wisconsin. Upon arrival, they made contact with Lisa Coleman, who initially refused to allow officers to enter. As their ostensible concern mounted, an officer ultimately told Lisa they “need[ed]” to enter the home. Lisa said “okay.” Applying a clear error review, and having reviewed the interaction in question, the Seventh concludes Lisa was not coerced and freely consented to this law enforcement entry into the home.
Amy Hadley v. City of South Bend, Indiana, No. 24-2448: Looking at IP records, police believed a wanted suspect had accessed Facebook from Hadley’s home. So they obtained a warrant, raided the home, launched 30 canisters of tear gas inside, “wrecked internal security cameras, punched holes in the walls, ransacked furniture and a closet, and tore down a panel on a wall and a fan in a bathroom.” The suspect was, in fact, not in the home. Hadley sued under the Fifth Amendment, arguing that the damage to her home was a “taking” to which she is entitled to compensation. Binding precedent says otherwise, so Hadley is on her own to rebuild her home.
James K. Breyley, III v. Larry Fuchs, No. 22-1663: Here, a Wisconsin prisoner appears to have pleaded a compelling case that the DOC were “deliberately indifferent” to his health and safety at New Lisbon Correctional. Breyley lost on procedural grounds below. However, the Seventh resurrects his lawsuit.
Norberto Torres v. Kent Brookman and Jason Hart, No. 22-2830: Yet another appeal highlighting the low due process standard for inmates confined in solitary confinement.
Bernard Mims v. City of Chicago, No. 24-1564: Mims was wrongly convicted of murder and served 10 years in prison as a result. He argues in this § 1983 proceeding that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose certain recordings. However, the case shows the fact-dependent nature of such inquiries, as the Court ultimately agrees that Mims has failed to prove the factual prerequisites for his claim.
November 2025:
United States of America v. Donald R. Felton, No. 23-1352: A rare defense win! (Of sorts.) In 2019, a confidential source came forward to report that Felton was involved in drug activity. Law enforcement ultimately sought a warrant that relied on that information, although they failed to inform the reviewing magistrate of a large amount of relevant material regarding the source’s credibility:
But the affidavit omitted key details concerning the confidential source’s credibility. Critically, the affidavit did not mention that the confidential source was paid $345 for his information concerning Felton; nor did it explain that, since 2013, the source had been cooperating with law enforcement in exchange for consideration in his pending cases and those of his friends. The affidavit also did not explain that at the time of the confidential source’s interview concerning Felton, law enforcement had discovered suspected methamphetamine in the source’s residence, and that the source may have believed that he would not be charged if he continued to assist in the Felton investigation. The affidavit also omitted additional details about the source’s criminal history, including his eight arrests and four convictions for driving with a suspended license, one arrest for resisting arrest, one conviction for interfering with judicial proceedings, and one conviction for assault. The confidential source also had a pending possession of methamphetamine charge, which was not disclosed in the affidavit.
The search warrant was approved and police permitted to install a GPS tracker on a car belonging to Felton’s girlfriend, which was alleged to be used in the drug enterprise. Felton was later seized in that car with a quantity of drugs. On appeal, the Court finds that the warrant relied almost entirely on the source’s tip and that the affidavit lacked sufficient corroborating detail. The warrant affidavit was also defective because it failed to provide any basis to assess the source’s reliability. The Court remands for a determination as to whether the officer recklessly or deliberately omitted the information about the source’s credibility in order to assess whether good faith saves the deficient warrant.
December 2025:
United States of America v. Antwan Eiland, No. 24-1528: Eiland raises numerous challenges on appeal. The most relevant to our readers is probably his claim that the Government’s rebuttal argument violated his Fifth Amendment right by claiming the defense had “no answer” to certain evidence it believed to be overwhelming. In context, the Court does not find this to be a violation, as it was a direct response to defense counsel’s “missing evidence” argument and was intended to refocus the jury on the evidence that had been presented.
Airron S. Blake v. United States of America, No. 23-2399: Shortly after Blake’s conviction, his lawyer was disbarred for conduct in another matter. Blake therefore urges the Court to adopt an exception to Strickland‘s presumption of competent representation in this IAC appeal. The Court refuses to do so, however, and finds that counsel did not act deficiently.
United States of America v. Travis Thomas, No. 24-3020: During voir dire, a prospective juror disclosed government and law enforcement adjacent work experience. She stated that these experiences may lead her to be impartial, spoke up for the hard work of local law enforcement, and averred that it was her experience that cases would not be brought unless there was strong prosecutive merit. The prospective juror was dismissed but the district court denied a motion for a new panel, finding that this answer hadn’t tainted all the other jurors. Applying a deferential standard of review, the Court affirms.
United States of America v. Jackie Edwards, Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3094: Edwards takes a kitchen sink approach to this litigation and some of his claims are harshly criticized for their perceived lack of merit. Of note, however, is the Court’s brief discussion of his claim that a Terry stop ripened into a de facto arrest. This case demonstrates the somewhat esoteric nature of the query, as the line between a temporary detention and a constructive arrest is a “subtle” one. Moreover, officers do not cross the line merely because they take actions designed to ensure their safety like brandishing weapons or handcuffing a suspect. Here, the Court is satisfied that police acted reasonably when they approached his car with an AR-15, attempted to shatter his window with the butt of that weapon and nearly bludgeoned Edwards with it, then forcibly handled his body while trying to determine if he possessed a weapon. Edwards was “a twice-convicted drug trafficker who—by his own words captured on the wiretap—was likely carrying a handgun and who, once stopped, resisted commands to show his hands and get out of his car and physically thwarted their efforts to frisk him for weapons.” Moreover, the seizure lasted only six minutes before police recovered an illegal firearm and formally arrested Edwards.
January 26:
United States of America v. Michael J. Yumang, No. 24-2671: This drug case originated in Milwaukee and involves alleged trafficking of methamphetamine. In response to a discovery request, Yumang’s lawyers learned that one of the forensic chemists who testified in his case and was testifying about a drug test conducted in 2019 had been placed on a “performance improvement plan” in 2023. That plan “identified certain deficiencies in the chemist’s productivity and technical competence.” The disclosure of that information was subject to a protective order. During trial, the defense, seeking to avoid running afoul of the protective order, asked unsuccessfully for permission to cross-examine the chemist about the PIP during a sidebar. The sidebar was not transcribed. However, the parties made a record of what happened later in the trial. Prior to that discussion, the defense inquired whether the courtroom would be closed. Following that prompt, the court temporarily cleared the courtroom so the parties could make a record. On appeal, Yumang therefore first argues that this closure of the courtroom violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Court, however, holds that this was too “trivial” of a closure to constitute a Sixth Amendment violation. Second, he argues that the district court erred in not permitting cross-examination of the chemist as to the PIP. He argues that this was not only an evidentiary error but also rises to the level of a Confrontation Clause violation. The Court concludes this was a reasonable, and harmless, limitation on Yumang’s right to cross-examination and affirms.
United States of America v. Farhan Sheikh, No 25-1011: Sheikh posted comments on his “iFunny” account in which he threatened to murder the staff at a specific clinic offering abortion services in the Chicago area. Helpfully, he commented on his original post with the clarification that “this is not a joke” and that “I post what I mean and I will carry out what I post.” Sheikh was then charged under a federal statute which criminalizes “transmitting a threat through interstate communications.” On appeal, he challenges the admission of certain evidence at this trial: testimony from clinic workers and images of security improvements. However, what “Sheikh’s post meant to those who were threatened and the actions they took in response tend to show that Sheikh made a true threat.” In the Court’s view, it is irrelevant “that the clinic workers learned about the threat from law enforcement; that they didn’t view the iFunny posts themselves; and that law enforcement encouraged the clinic to implement security measures.”
United States of America v. Dazmine Erving, Nos. 23-2828 & 2831: Erving appeals the an adverse suppression ruling, arguing that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective search of his car. Here, police noticed the car when it was parked in a closed, dark parking lot around 3 AM. Upon approaching the car and shining a light into it, an officer observed two persons making “sudden movements” that suggested the persons may have hiding something. Further investigation revealed a man and woman, partially dressed, and a lingering odor of burnt cannabis. The man produced ID and the woman gave what the officer later suspected was a fake name. Upon running the man’s information, he learned that Erving was on supervised release for a weapons offense. He permitted both persons to retrieve their belongings from the car. He then “poked his head” into the car and saw a gun under the seat.
On appeal, the question becomes whether this was a valid “protective search” which requires reasonable suspicion that “the suspect is dangerous” and (2) “the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” Here, there were three pieces of evidence establishing the first criterion. First, Erving made “furtive” movements while inside a car that was parked in a darkened parking lot early in the morning. Second, there was an odor of marijuana and “it is reasonable to suspect that someone who is under the influence of intoxicants is more likely to pose a danger to others.” Third, the officer had knowledge that Erving was on supervised release for a weapons offense. As to the second requirement–that Erving could have “gained immediate control of weapons”–he was not under arrest and therefore was capable of returning to the car and arming himself. The Court therefore rejects Erving’s argument that the officer lacked any subjective fear for his safety, as the test is an objective one.
United States of America v. Ryan Douglas, No. 23-3399: Multiple CIs reported that Douglas was selling cocaine and methamphetamine and using his black BMW when conducting those sales. Police were able to conduct a controlled buy which was conducted inside that car. Police then obtained a warrant to search a residence where Douglas had also been seen. While the Court agrees that a magistrate may “infer that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where the dealer lives,” this affidavit failed to concretely link Douglas to the residence in question. Not just any place a drug dealer visits is subject to a search. However, while the Court agrees with Douglas that the connection here was tenuous, it ultimately uses the good-faith doctrine to rescue the conduct of law enforcement. Likewise, while it also agrees the affidavit seeking to search his cell phone was “weak,” it deploys the doctrine to rescue this search, as well.
O’Neal Johnson v. Ryan Edwards, No. 24-1503: In context of a § 1983 lawsuit, Court holds that police have “arguable probable cause” to arrest for disorderly conduct when a person refuses commands to leave an active crime scene.
United States of America v. Jose Reyna, No. 23-1231: We include this case for those tracking gun law developments. Here, Reyna was charged with a federal offense which prohibits obliterating the serial number on firearm. The case is an interesting read for those seeking to explore the nuances of the Bruen test; ultimately, however, it concludes that this regulation fits within a historical tradition and rejects Reyna’s constitutional challenge.