COA affirms circuit court’s finding of reasonable suspicion for traffic stop resulting in OWI 3rd
State v. Troy A. Wry, 2023AP561, 2/3/26, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
Wry appeals his conviction for OWI 3rd, arguing the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion that Wry had committed, or was committing, an offense sufficient to conduct an investigatory stop of his vehicle. COA affirms.
Dispatch alerted a sheriff’s deputy that an individual had called and reported someone in a dark pickup truck showed up at their house potentially intoxicated and then left when asked to do so. (¶2). When the deputy was driving toward the complainant’s residence, dispatch reported that the truck had returned to the residence but had left again. (¶3). Nearing the residence, the deputy saw the truck and followed it, observing it weave within its lane of traffic. (¶¶3-4). The truck “narrowly missed a couple of mailboxes.” (¶4). The deputy stopped following the truck when it crossed into another county, but he ran the license plate and saw that the registered owner lived within the county, so he drove toward that address and waited. The deputy saw the truck again 10-15 minutes later, and immediately stopped it. (¶5).
Wry makes a number of arguments, including that the report lacked sufficient detail to be reliable. (¶10). COA acknowledges that this is a close case, but concludes that the information provided by the complainant in conjunction with the deputy’s observations provided reasonable suspicion to stop Wry’s vehicle. It concludes that the report contained sufficient indicia of reliability because it was not anonymous because the individual at least provided their address, called twice, and gave a description of the vehicle. (¶11). COA further reasons that the deputy corroborated that limited information with his own observations, finding a matching vehicle near the address provided and witnessing the vehicle swerving, narrowly missing some mailboxes. (¶12).
Because of the initial reports, COA rejects Wry’s argument that the deputy’s observations of his truck weaving within the lane of traffic lane was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop. (¶13). The reports that Wry went to the complainant’s home around midnight and later returned after having been told to leave was “unusual behavior” that the deputy “was not required to ignore.” (¶14). COA also rejects Wry’s argument that the deputy knew he did not have reasonable suspicion because he did not stop Wry immediately, holding the initial failure to stop is of no legal significance.(¶¶15-16). The deputy’s delay doesn’t matter because reasonable suspicion is an objective standard. (¶16). Finally, the court rejects Wry’s argument that any reasonable suspicion of impairment dissipated when the deputy lost sight of the truck. (¶¶19-20). Even if “anything could [have] happened,” such as Wry switching places with someone else who had been driving when the deputy first saw the truck, an officer is not required to accept an innocent explanation where competing reasonable inferences could be drawn, and only about 10-15 minutes passed before the deputy saw the truck again. (¶¶20-21).