On Point

Defense Win: COA, in decision recommended for publication, finds reverse waiver statute unconstitutional

State v. Noah Q. Mann-Tate, 2024AP2585-CR, 2/3/26, District I (recommended for publication); case activity

In a massively consequential decision, COA reaffirms the uniqueness of children facing criminal charges and finds our notoriously-stringent reverse waiver statute unconstitutional as a result.

Mann-Tate was 10 years old when he allegedly killed his mother under disputed circumstances. (¶3). Although prosecutors had a range of potential charges to consider given the murky facts–including Mann-Tate’s claim that the gun accidentally discharged–they made the choice to allege the most serious offense possible, first-degree intentional homicide. (Id.). As a result, Wisconsin law mandated that his case originate in “adult” court as opposed to the juvenile justice system. (¶7). Mann-Tate moved to dismiss the adult charges, arguing that Wisconsin’s “reverse-waiver” process (in which the juvenile has the burden of proving his case should be transferred to juvenile court) is unconstitutional. (¶9). The circuit court denied the motion. (Id.). As to the reverse waiver criteria, the court expressed its belief that Mann-Tate did not belong in the adult system. (¶12). Yet, based on the circumscribed inquiry mandated by the legislature, the court found it had no choice but to decline the motion for reverse waiver, as well. (Id.).

On appeal, COA agrees with Mann-Tate that our reverse waiver statute, as set forth in § 970.032(2) fails to provide constitutionally-required procedural due process to young defendants like Mann-Tate. (¶2). In its view, the statute “is unconstitutional to the extent it does not require circuit courts to consider the unique attributes of youth identified by the United States Supreme Court.” (Id.).

COA’s reasoning proceeds as follows. First, it is undisputed that Mann-Tate has a right to procedural due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. (¶30). At its core, the constitution requires “fundamentally fair” procedures. (Id.). The case is not about whether Mann-Tate had a substantive right to be treated as a juvenile. (¶43). Instead, because the legislature has created a statutory mechanism for Mann-Tate to seek transfer of his case to juvenile court, the relevant question is whether that process satisfies this fundamental fairness criterion. (Id.).

Second, COA relies on a series of cases from the United States Supreme Court (Miller v. Alabama, Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons) for the proposition that juveniles have “distinctive attributes” and that “these attributes inform what process is due to juveniles whose cases originate in the adult criminal justice system.” (¶29). An evolving legal and scientific consensus, as discussed in this line of cases, demonstrates that juveniles are, simply, different than adult defenders for obvious and commonsense reasons: their still-developing brains, susceptibility to negative environmental influences, lack of impulse control, and potential for rehabilitation among other identifiable characteristics.

In looking at the reverse waiver statute, COA is troubled that none of these special considerations are mentioned, or even allowed to be considered, in such proceedings:

The problem, then, is that WIS. STAT. § 970.032(2) does not require consideration of the impacts of the juvenile’s youth before determining whether the juvenile is tried as an adult. Without consideration of these characteristics of youth, children for whom the juvenile system is more appropriate may remain in the adult system because the three reverse waiver criteria do not require the court to consider information that is fundamental to determining whether a juvenile should remain in criminal court or be waived to juvenile court, including the juvenile’s capacity for reform and rehabilitation. Section 970.032(2), in its current form, violates due process because it does not provide a meaningful opportunity for a juvenile to prove that he or she is not one of the “rare and unfortunate cases” that warrant treating the juvenile as having the same culpability as an adult. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 109 (Thomas, J. dissenting).

In particular, the criterion of whether waiver would depreciate the seriousness of the offense fails to consider how the unique characteristics of youth impact the seriousness of any given offense. The Supreme Court decisions described above require courts to acknowledge that a youth who commits an offense is less culpable than an adult who commits the same offense. The reverse waiver procedure is rendered functionally meaningless if courts are not required to consider that children’s “‘lack of maturity and … underdeveloped sense of responsibility’” leads them to poor decision making. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citation omitted). This concept is so fundamental that the Supreme Court described it as something “any parent knows[.]” Id.

(¶35-36).

COA therefore swats away several contrary arguments from the State, finding none of them sufficiently compelling to override the impact of these US Supreme Court decisions on its analysis. It therefore reverses and remands for a new reverse waiver hearing which will consider those factors identified by the US Supreme Court including: (1) the juvenile’s chronological age related to immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile’s family and home environment that surrounds him or her; (3) the circumstances of the offense, including the extent of participation in the criminal conduct; (4) the impact of familiar and peer pressures; (5) the effect of the offender’s youth on his or her ability to navigate the criminal justice process; and (6) the possibility of rehabilitation.” (¶46).