7th Circuit scolds state but denies habeas relief on Brady and Trombetta/Youngblood claims
Chong L. Lee v. Bradley Mlodzik, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 24-2647, 3/24/26
“The State of Wisconsin violated Chong Lee’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights while prosecuting him for murder[,]” as it failed to disclose that it had interviewed 3 eyewitnesses and intentionally destroyed recordings of those interviews to ensure he could not obtain them. Despite these Brady and Trombetta/Youngblood violations, the 7th Circuit affirms the remedy applied by the state trial court.
Although the 7th Circuit warns the state to “think hard about the conduct that brought this case before us” it determines that the state court’s application of Brady was not unreasonable, and the remedy for the Trombetta/Youngblood violation is similarly not “forbid[den.]”
As to his Brady claim, the WI COA rejected Chong’s arguments because it was too speculative (i.e., he could not prove that the statements were exculpatory because the recordings no longer existed). The court here “take[s] Chong’s point that the State’s prior conduct has hamstrung him now.” It states that were it deciding this issue in the first instance, the circumstantial evidence and Chong’s “well-crafted argument” might be enough to grant him relief. However, Chong fails to meet any of the demanding standards for habeas relief, and the court concludes that the state court did not act contrary to or unreasonably apply federal law in holding the suppressed evidence was not favorable to Chong.
Next, the state concedes that it violated Trombetta and Youngblood. The question on appeal is whether the remedy implemented by the trial court was unreasonably or incorrectly upheld on appeal. The remedy here was that the state was not allowed to call the eyewitnesses who’s statements it destroyed, but Chong could have done so (and risked opening the door on harmful information without the benefit of their prior statements to impeach). The court recognizes that the remedy could have been more beneficial to Chong, but it “cannot grant habeas merely because we can imagine ways the trial court could have crafted a better remedy.” It can only intervene if it concludes that federal law indisputably forbids the remedy the Wisconsin court imposed or compels a different remedy. Ultimately, the court does not conclude the state court acted contrary to or unreasonably applied federal law, as the federal case law does not compel a specific remedy when the state destroys evidence.