On Point

COA affirms ch. 51 recommitment due to forfeiture of hearsay objection, takes judicial notice of a criminal complaint

Fond du Lac County v. S.R.H., 2025AP2727-FT, 3/18/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity

“Seth” challenges the 2025 extension of his ch. 51 commitment, contending that Fond du Lac County failed to introduce clear and convincing evidence to support the conclusion that he is dangerous pursuant to either WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. or 51.20(1)(am) and that the circuit court therefore erred in entering the extension order on those grounds. COA affirms.

This recommitment occurred nearly five years after Seth’s initial commitment in this matter. (¶2). At the recommitment hearing, the county called Dr. Khalid Chaudhry, a licensed psychiatrist, and Brittany Kornfehl, APNP, a licensed nurse practitioner, both of whom had provided psychiatric treatment for Seth, and introduced their joint report.

The doctor testified that he had tried to meet with Seth, but that Seth refused and made derogatory remarks to him. He had previously been one of Seth’s treating psychiatrists on and off. He testified that Seth suffered from schiozaffective disorder and explained some of Seth’s history. (¶¶3-7).

The nurse practitioner, seemingly Seth’s treatment provider under the commitment, testified that she had been seeing Seth every three months, including during his recent hospitalization. She stated she had seen him exhibiting “psychotic symptoms.”(¶9). The nurse practitioner then testified about Seth’s hospitalization and noted that, “It’s understood that as a result of those calls he has new criminal charges.” (¶11). The nurse practitioner also recounted Seth’s history of making threats.

Seth’s counsel objected to the report on the basis that it contained hearsay statements from multiple individuals, including other treatment providers and police officers. The circuit court admitted the report but stated it would not rely on the hearsay statements. (¶8). Seth testified on his own behalf.

The circuit court granted the county’s request for an extension of the commitment, noting Seth’s history of AODA and mental health needs, and his behavior, lack of insight into his mental illness, history of noncompliance of medications and the nurse practitioner’s testimony about Seth’s symptoms. (¶17).

Seth first argues that there was no evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior, only testimony that he had been charged with “battery, resisting or obstructing, disorderly conduct” in the past. Thus, the
circuit court’s statement that “[t]here are new events of battery, resisting, obstructing, [and] disorderly conduct”—and its reliance on that belief—was clearly erroneous. He also contends that the nurse practitioner’s testimony that he had made comments about “pile-driving a woman[,]” “comments made to sacrifice someone to the devil[,]” and “a description of sending a bullet” was hearsay, and the court erred in relying on them because it had previously indicated it would not consider those statements as true. Seth further argues that these comments, even if otherwise admissible, did not constitute “‘threats’ to do ‘serious physical harm’ that would place others ‘in reasonable fear of serious harm’” under sub. 2.b. because it was unclear as to whom he may have been talking to when these purported statements were made, the context in which they arose, “or whether he had ever threatened or harmed that person in the past.” (¶22).

The county argues that the report contained sufficient information to establish recent and past verbal threats, as well as a “long history of dangerous behavior and regular medication noncompliance that resulted in decompensation” and multiple hospitalizations, including one that year. (¶23). It also “points to CCAP records reflecting the State charged Seth in March 2025, with violating WIS. STAT. § 940.204(2) (Bodily Harm or Threat to Employee of Health Care Facility or Family as a repeater), and the circuit court made “reasonable inferences in [its] factual findings regarding pending criminal charges for battery mentioned during [the nurse practitioner’s] testimony.” The county further asserts that COA “can and should” review transcripts from prior hearings to search for support for the circuit court’s findings. (¶24).

COA acknowledges that the circuit court failed to reference a specific subsection § 51.20(1)(a)2., but holds that “it is clear from the hearing transcript and the written Extension Order entered following the hearing that it determined the County had carried its burden of establishing dangerousness under both § 51.20(1)(a)2.b and § 51.20(1)(am)” as the court checked the boxes on the form. COA also concludes that the county presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support the circuit court’s conclusion that Seth is dangerous within the meaning of § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. (¶28). It relies on the nurse practitioner’s testimony of threats Seth made during his recent hospitalization, and rejects his argument that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay because he failed to object to her testimony during the hearing (only objected to the hearsay contained in the report) and therefore forfeited the argument. (¶¶29-30).

COA also relies on the certified copy of the criminal complaint filed against Seth for his conduct while hospitalized, which the county included with its appellate brief. It concludes it is appropriate to take judicial notice of that complaint but notes that “it does so only to the extent the allegations set forth therein provide additional support for NP Kornfehl’s testimony regarding statements Seth made during his hospitalization and her reference to the State having filed criminal charges stemming from the statements made during that time.” (¶31). COA relies on the allegations in the complaint to support the nurse practitioner’s testimony and the circuit court’s conclusion that Seth was dangerous within the meaning of 2.b. (¶32). The court concludes that the “totality of the evidence presented” satisfies it that the circuit court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and it did not err in concluding that the county established dangerousness. (¶33).