COA upholds Act 79 vehicle search where officer seized suspect while performing community caretaking function and subsequently developed reasonable suspicion of drug use
State of Wisconsin v. Brandon L. Strickland, 2024AP2376-CR, 3/17/26, District III (not recommended for publication); case activity
The COA determined that law enforcement’s community caretaking function justified an officer to direct a person out of his vehicle after the officer found the person asleep at the wheel while the car was parked in his driveway. And because the officer developed reasonable suspicion that the suspect used and possessed a controlled substance and was on probation, the officer lawfully searched the vehicle under Act 79.
A Marinette police officer was dispatched to Brandon Strickland’s residence at 7:30 a.m. after receiving a report that a man was “slumped over” behind the steering wheel of a car parked in the driveway. The officer saw Strickland “slumped over” in the driver’s seat of a car wearing a seat belt with the car turned off. The officer knocked on the window and Strickland “startled” awake. Strickland complied with the officer’s request to open the car door and the officer asked for his identification. Strickland located his driver’s license after he needed time to find his wallet and “fumble through it.” The officer learned from dispatch that Strickland was on probation and was subject to an active, nonextraditable warrant from Georgia. (¶¶ 3-4).
The officer testified at the evidentiary hearing on Strickland’s motion to suppress that, at this point, he did not believe Strickland was “necessarily in need of medical attention” but he asked Strickland to step out of the vehicle “to check if there was anything maybe medically wrong or just to see if there was some kind of impairment” to explain why he was slumped over. Strickland stumbled as he got out of the car and the officer assisted him up. The officer saw that Strickland’s eyes were red and bloodshot and observed a syringe cap on the driver’s side floorboard, which the officer suspected could be evidence of drug use. (¶5). Strickland “struggled” to follow the officer’s directions to keep his hands out of his pockets and, as a result, the officer asked for consent to search his person; Strickland consented and the search revealed nothing. The officer then asked Strickland for consent to search his vehicle; Strickland refused and told the officer to get a warrant. The officer asked Strickland why he was on probation, which Strickland said were nondrug-related felonies. (¶ 6). The officer testified that he knew probationers were subject to rules prohibiting alcohol and drug use, so he searched the vehicle based on Act 79 and seized syringes and methamphetamine. (¶ 7). After his motion to suppress was denied, Strickland pled no contest to possessing methamphetamine.
Strickland argued on appeal that the circuit court erred by denying his motion because the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not justify seizing him after the officer determined he did not need medical assistance, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to extend his seizure, and Act 79 did not justify searching his vehicle because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (¶ 11).
Regarding the community caretaker exception, the COA held that the officer “was lawfully engaged in a community caretaker function through the point at which Strickland exited his vehicle.” (¶ 19). Although Strickland regained consciousness and the officer did not perceive any signs of a drug overdose, the COA determined the officer continued to engage in a community caretaking function when he asked Strickland to exit the vehicle. (¶ 21). The COA noted that the officer testified that he asked Strickland to exit the vehicle to “check if there was anything maybe medically wrong” with him and “to see if there was some kind of impairment,” which the COA considered “legitimate concerns.” (¶ 22). And the fact that Strickland was found unconscious at 7:30 a.m., rather than in the evening or early morning, was “more indicative of a possible medical issue as opposed to some other impairment.” (¶ 22). Although the officer testified that he was not just concerned whether Strickland needed medical attention when he asked him out of the vehicle because he was looking for signs of impairment, the COA found that the officer’s subjective motivation did not negate the objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaking function to apply. (¶ 24) (citing Kramer).
The COA distinguished the case from Wiskowski, where SCOW held that police unreasonably prolonged seizing the defendant who had been sleeping in his car. Wiskowski fell asleep behind the wheel while he was in a drive-through lane at McDonald’s. By the time an officer arrived at the scene, however, Wiskowski had awoke, exited McDonald’s, and drove away without incident. Nevertheless, the officer stopped Wiskowski, who said he fell asleep because he had been working for 24 hours. (¶ 31). Here, the COA found, Strickland was unconscious for a longer period, there was no explanation for why he fell asleep in his car, he had trouble finding his wallet and presenting his driver’s license, and he was not held for any time while the officer tried to determine if he had reasonable suspicion. (¶ 35).
The COA also found that the officer developed reasonable suspicion that Strickland possessed and consumed an illegal controlled substance by the time he got out of his car. The COA considered that Strickland had passed out behind the wheel at 7:30 a.m., his seatbelt was fastened but the car was off, he had difficulty finding his wallet and driver’s license, he was on probation for a felony, he had a warrant for his arrest from Georgia, he tried to get out of the car with his seatbelt fastened, he stumbled when he got out of the car, his eyes were bloodshot, he struggled to keep his hands out of his pockets, and the officer saw a syringe cap on the floor of the vehicle. (¶ 39). The COA rejected Strickland’s innocent explanations for each observation, which it described as a “divide and conquer” analysis that was rejected by SCOW in Genous because the proper analytical framework is the totality of circumstances. (¶ 42). The COA also noted that an officer is not required to accept innocent explanations when confronted with two reasonable competing inferences. (¶ 42).
Because the officer had reasonable suspicion that Strickland possessed a controlled substance, the COA concluded he was authorized to search the vehicle under Act 79, which allows law enforcement to search a probationer’s property if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is committing, about to commit, or had committed a crime or violated a condition of probation. (¶45).