Defense win: COA reverses guardianship med order
Grant County Dept of Social Services v. D.G.N., 2025AP2382, 2/27/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
In this appeal limited to the validity of an order for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication in a guardianship case, COA holds that the county failed to meet two of the Wis. Stat. § 55.14(3) requirements.
The county filed petitions for guardianship and protective placement in February 2025, and DGN stipulated to the entry of those two orders. (¶2). However, DNG contested the county’s petition for an involuntary medication order. The county called one witness at the hearing, a psychiatrist and the medical director for the county’s community services agency. (¶4). The doctor testified that she sat in on meetings with DGN’s treatment team, reviewed his record, and met with him in person.
DGN raises two issues on appeal: “(1) whether D.G.N. had been prescribed psychotropic medication by a physician in accord with § 55.14(3)(a); and (2) whether D.G.N., if not involuntarily medicated, would pose a substantial probability of specific harms to himself or to others as specified in § 55.15(3)(e).” (¶3).
As to § 55.14(3)(a), the county show that “[a] physician has prescribed psychotropic medication for the individual.” (¶10). The doctor testified that she had not prescribed psychotropic medications to D.G.N. Rather, a nurse practitioner on staff prescribed the medication, though she, as medical director, reviewed the prescription. (¶13). The county made two arguments, that the doctor prescribed the medication because she reviewed it, and that a nurse practitioner can prescribe medication. (¶¶14, 17). COA rejects these arguments, interpreting the plain language of the statute as written, and concludes that the county failed to prove this requirement by clear and convincing evidence. (¶¶15-17).
DGN also argues that the county did not prove, by either of the two evidentiary paths available, that without involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs, he would demonstrate a substantial probability of harm to himself or others, as is required by § 55.14(3)(e). As the county contends it met its burden as to each of the alternative means, COA addresses each in turn.
First, sub. (3)(e)1. permits a finding of a substantial probability of harm when the individual has a “history of at least 2 episodes, one of which has occurred within the previous 24 months, that indicate a pattern of overt activity, attempts, threats to act, or omissions that resulted from the individual’s failure to participate in treatment, including psychotropic medication, and that resulted in a … commitment ordered under s. 51.20 (13).” COA considers the documents the county relies on in the record, including the doctor’s letter and DGN’s comprehensive evaluation, which was prepared by a county employee who did not testify. The court concludes, however, that the record contains no information about the circumstances that led to a commitment. Therefore, the county failed to meet (3)(e)1. (¶23).
Second, under § 55.14(3)(e)2., the county may prove a substantial probability of harm by showing D.G.N. to be dangerous under one or more of the § 51.20 dangerousness standards. The county argues that it proved the dangerousness criterion in § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., often called the “fifth standard.” (¶24). COA focuses on two elements of the fifth standard: (1) a substantial probability that the individual will, if left untreated, lack services necessary for the individual’s health or safety; and (2) a substantial probability that the individual will, if left untreated, suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result in the loss of his or her ability to function independently in the community or the loss of cognitive or volitional control over his thoughts or actions. COA concludes that the county failed to meet either of these elements of the fifth standard. It focuses on the lack of evidence on how DGN would would lack services under the guardianship and protective placement, and that “[t]he record is simply insufficient, both about events in D.G.N.’s past and about his condition at the time of the hearing” to show a substantial probability of severe harm if he is left untreated. (¶¶25-29).