COA: Restitution properly awarded to disorderly conduct victim where defendant fled in and did not return car jointly owned with victim.
State v. Alexander C. Beaver, 2025AP1768-CR, 4/1/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA affirmed the circuit court’s award of restitution to a disorderly conduct victim where the defendant fled the scene in a vehicle jointly owned by the victim and the defendant and did not return the vehicle.
Alexander Beaver was convicted of disorderly conduct related to a domestic dispute with his girlfriend that resulted in Beaver leaving the residence they shared in the car they jointly owned and never returning the car. (¶ 7). Beaver was ordered to pay half of the value of the car to the victim as restitution because the circuit court found a causal nexus between Beaver’s offense of conviction and the victim’s loss of her vehicle. (¶ 9).
Wisconsin’s restitution statute requires the circuit court to order the defendant to make full or partial restitution to any victim of a crime considered at sentencing. Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r). To be entitled to restitution, the victim must show a causal nexus between the crime committed and the damage to be compensated. (¶ 5). Beaver argued on appeal there was no causal nexus between his disorderly conduct and the victim losing use of her car.
The COA noted that, to prove a causal nexus between the offense of conviction and the damage to be compensated, the victim “need only show that the defendant’s criminal activity was a substantial factor in causing injury, damage, or loss; that the defendant’s actions were the precipitating cause of the injury, damage, or loss; and that it was the natural consequence of the actions.” (¶ 5). And the crime considered at sentencing, for restitution purposes, includes all facts “related to the crime for which the defendant was convicted, not just those facts necessary to support the elements of the specific charge of which the defendant was convicted.” (¶ 6).
Given these guidelines, the COA concluded the circuit court “properly determined that the financial loss suffered by Beaver’s victim as a result of Beaver taking the vehicle and depriving her of its use, was substantially caused by Beaver’s disorderly conduct.” (¶ 11).