Seventh Circuit finds Wisconsin did not violate plaintiff’s civil rights by denying permit to carry a concealed weapon after court martial conviction for a misdemeanor drug offense.
Kenneth Karwacki v. Josh Kaul, No. 25-2361, 4/2/26
In a brief opinion affirming the district court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s claims that Wisconsin violated his constitutional rights by denying his application for a permit to carry a concealed firearm, the Seventh Circuit Court provides a primer on the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and summarizes recent federal cases addressing Second Amendment challenges to laws prohibiting possessing firearms due to criminal convictions.
Kenneth Karwacki was convicted by a special court martial of the misdemeanor offense of delivering peyote to other soldiers. His application for concealed carry permit in Wisconsin was denied because Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(b) prohibits a person from possessing a firearm if the person was convicted “of a crime elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in this state”; delivering peyote is a felony in Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(a). Karwacki claimed his federal civil rights were violated because Wisconsin violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and his Second Amendment right to bear arms.
The United States Constitution, Art. IV § 1, provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” Karwacki argued that Wisconsin violated the clause by treating his military misdemeanor conviction as a state-law felony. The Court rejected this claim because a federal court martial is not a judicial proceeding of another state and the clause does not apply to federal judgments. (Slip op. at 2). Further, the court noted that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is designed to “ensure that judgments retain their primary effects,” but “does not prevent states from specifying domestic civil consequences of foreign judgments.” (Slip op. at p. 3).
As to Karwacki’s Second Amendment claims, the Court cited its decisions issued simultaneously in Prince and Watson rejecting claims that the federal statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) is facially unconstitutional. (Slip op. at 4). The Court also found Karwacki did not present a claim that Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(b) is unconstitutional as applied to him because “the relation between drug distribution and firearm-related violence is too well established to call for elaboration.” (Slip op. at 4).
The Court noted that SCOTUS held in Rahimi that governments may “disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others.” The Court agreed with other circuits’ decisions rejecting as-applied challenges by those convicted of distributing drugs and, “as far as we can tell, none of the federal courts of appeals has accepted an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) or a similar state law by a convicted distributor.” The Court considered it an “open question” whether any as-applied challenge to federal or state statutes attaching firearms restrictions to criminal convictions is “tenable . . . But if an as-applied challenge ever is possible, a person with a conviction for distributing unlawful drugs cannot be the beneficiary.” (Slip op. at 5).