On Point blog, page 5 of 9
Lower burden of proof at ch. 980 discharge trial doesn’t violate due process
State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2015 WI App 4; case activity
A person committed as a sexually violent person under ch. 980 does not have a due process right to have the state prove at a discharge hearing that he is still a sexually violent person, so the clear and convincing evidence standard under § 980.09(3) is not facially unconstitutional.
Trial counsel’s failure to object to jury instruction deprives appellant of right to challenge sufficiency of evidence
State v. Addison F. Steiner, 2013AP2629-CR, district 4, 10/16/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This case raises an issue that even the court of appeals deemed to be of first impression. Does §948.20, which criminalizes abandonment of a child, require an intent to abandon a child permanently, or is leaving a child alone for 1 or 2 hours enough? If the latter, then how is “child abandonment” different from “child neglect” under §948.21? The court of appeals refused to address the issue for reasons that should trouble anyone challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict.
SCOW: Violation of right to public trial is forfeited if defendant doesn’t object
State v. Nancy J. Pinno & State v. Travis J. Seaton, 2014 WI 74, 7/18/14, on certification from the court of appeals, and affirming the circuit court’s orders denying postconviction relief; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity: Pinno; Seaton
Deciding an issue left open by State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶34-38, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, the supreme court rejects the argument that the right to a public trial must be affirmatively and knowingly waived by the defendant. Instead, the court holds, “[a] defendant who fails to object to a judicial decision to close the courtroom forfeits the right to a public trial, so long as the defendant is aware that the judge excluded the public from the courtroom.” (¶7).
Judge’s factual findings weren’t clearly erroneous, despite officer’s equivocal testimony
City of Antigo v. M.K., 2013AP2627, District 3, 7/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court held there was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle M.K. was driving because the court found the officer knew the vehicle’s registration was expired before he made the stop. The court’s finding of fact was not clearly erroneous, even though the officer’s testimony was equivocal as to whether he learned that fact as part of the original dispatch or after he spotted the vehicle and called in the license plate.
SCOW: Six-person jury for involuntary mental commitment survives equal protection challenge
Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R., 2012AP958, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity
Majority opinion by Justice Crooks; concurrence by Chief Justice Abrahamson; additional concurrence by Justice Ziegler (joined by Justices Roggensack and Gableman)
The issues in this case spring from State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 318-319, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995)(“persons committed under Chapters 51 and 980 are similarly situated for purposes of equal protection comparison) and State v.
Right to confront and present evidence; probative value of evidence outweighed by prejudicial effect, § 904.03
State v. Damon R. Lowe, 2012AP555-CR, District 2, 9/18/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Lowe, charged with sexual and physical abuse of V.A.L., his adopted daughter, sought to present evidence that she was motivated to fabricate her allegations because she wanted to get away from her overly strict father, who restricted her use of cell phones, her internet use, and her choice of friends.
State v. Nancy J. Pinno, 2011AP2424-CR/State v. Travis J. Seaton, 2012AP918, certification granted, 2/25/13
On review of court of appeals certification; case activity: Pinno; Seaton
Issue (from certification):
Is the failure to object to the closure of a public trial to be analyzed upon appellate review under the “forfeiture standard” or the “waiver standard”?
See our previous post for further discussion.
Plea Bargains: Breach by Defendant (Bail-Jumping, Fail Appear at Sentencing) – State No Longer Bound by Terms
State v. Laurence W. Tucker, 2012 WI App 67 (recommended for publication); for Tucker: Robert T. Ruth; case activity
Tucker pleaded guilty pursuant to plea bargain, which terms included continuation of his release on bond and compliance with same. After Tucker failed to appear at sentencing, necessitating his arrest on a bench warrant and issuance of a new charge of bail jumping, the State informed counsel it was no longer bound by the agreement,
Sentencing – Discretion – Victim Allocution
State v. Christina L. Contizano, 2011AP477-CR, District 4, 10/27/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Contizano: Robert C. Howard III; case activity
At Contizano’s sentencing for obstructing, based on lying to the police about her daughter’s location, the trial court didn’t erroneously exercise discretion in allowing Contizano’s ex-husband to advocate as a “victim” of the offense, in favor of a term of incarceration.
¶7 We conclude the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it considered the Walworths’ statements at sentencing.
Plea Bargain Breach: Prosecutorial Failure to Make Agreed IC-Recommendation not Material Breach
State v. Mark Allan Campbell, 2011 WI App 18; for Campbell: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; Campbell BiC; State Resp.; Reply
(Sentencing issue in the case discussed separately, here.)
Plea Bargain – Breach
The plea agreement required the prosecutor to recommend a 20-year sentence, comprised of 5-7 years’ confinement and the balance on extended supervision,