On Point blog, page 10 of 25

Inmate’s previous motions didn’t bar habeas petition challenging implementation of sentences

State ex rel. Gregory S. Gorak v. Michael Meisner, Warden, 2017AP39, District 1, 2/27/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court denied Gorak’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus after deciding it was procedurally barred because the issues it raised had already been litigated and decided.  The court of appeals holds that is not the case. 

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SCOTUS: Guilty plea doesn’t forfeit challenge to constitutionality of statute of conviction on appeal

Rodney Class v. United States, USSC No. 16-424, 2018 WL 987347 (February 21, 2018), reversing United States v. Class, (unreported) (D.C. Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (inlcuding links to briefs and commentary)

“The question [in this case] is whether a guilty plea by itself bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. We hold that it does not. Class did not relinquish his right to appeal the District Court’s constitutional determinations simply by pleading guilty.” (Slip op. at 3).

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Court of appeals clarifies “guilty plea waiver” rule, says lawyers needn’t advise clients about DACA consequences of plea

State v. Marcos Rosas Villegas, 2018 WI App 9; case activity (including briefs)

This opinion resolves 2 issues worthy of publication and has already generated a petition for review (from an earlier version of the opinion, which was withdrawn and has now been replaced).  According to the court of appeals, an attorney does not perform deficiently by failing to inform his client, an undocumented immigrant, that a plea would render him inadmissible to the U.S. and ineligible for DACA. Furthermore–for the first time–the court of appeals holds that the “guilty plea waiver” rule applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless such a claim is offered as a reason to overturn the plea itself.

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Evidence sufficient on time of driving for OWI

Fond du Lac County v. Christy Ann Kasten, 2017AP343, 10/18/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The only real issue in this case is whether the court, in this bench trial, had sufficient evidence to conclude that Kasten had driven within three hours of her blood draw at 10:52 p.m. The court of appeals holds that it did:

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SCOW will review how court of appeals decide prejudice under Strickland in multi-count cases

State v. Lamont Donnell Sholar, 2016AP987, petition for review granted 10/17/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. When assessing the prejudice of defense counsel’s deficient performance in a multiple-count jury trial, may a court divide the prejudice analysis on a count-by-count basis, finding prejudice warranting relief on some counts from the single trial but not others?

2. If a party fails to file a petition for review following an unfavorable Court of Appeals ruling on a particular argument, may the party re-litigate the same question in a second appeal of the same case?

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SCOTUS to clarify plain error review standard

Rosales-Mireles v. United States, USSC No. 16-9493, cert granted 9/28/17

Question presented:

In United States v. Olano, this Court held that, under the fourth prong of plain error review, “[t]he Court of Appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). To meet that standard, is it necessary, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals required, that the error be one that “would shock the conscience of the common man, serve as a powerful indictment against our system of justice, or seriously call into question the competence or integrity of the district judge?”

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Expert on child victim reporting behaviors met Daubert standard

State v. Adam M. Zamora, 2016AP1923-CR, District 2, 9/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in determining that an expert witness called to testify about child sexual assault victim reporting behaviors met the so-called Daubert standard codified in § 907.02(1).

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Plea withdrawal denied due to lack of evidence of intoxication during plea hearing

State v. Santos Lee Hernandez, 2017AP62-CR, 7/11/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hernandez filed a postconviction motion arguing that he pled guilty to lewd and lascivious behavior while he was drunk–so drunk that he incorrectly told the court that he had not consumed alcohol within the previous 24 hours, that he understood the rights he was waiving, and that there was a factual basis for his plea. In rejecting his claim, the court of appeals commits an error that continues to dog postconviction motions.

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SCOTUS delves into structural error

Weaver v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 16-240, 2017 WL 2674153 (June 22, 2017); affirming Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495 (Mass. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Members of the public–specifically, Kentel Weaver’s family–were excluded from the overcrowded courtroom during jury selection for his trial. Violations of the Sixth Amendment right to public trial have been called structural errors not susceptible to harmless error analysis. But Weaver’s lawyer didn’t object, so this is an ineffective assistance claim, which of course requires him to show prejudice. But how do you show that you were prejudiced by a structural error–after all, the term refers to an error whose “effect … cannot be ascertained”? United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).

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Issues, arguments, and objecting to telephonic testimony

Marquette County v. T.F.W., 2017AP5, 6/8/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

T.F.W. objected to the having his treating psychiatrist testify by telephone at his Chapter 51 extension hearing. He cited both §885.60 and “due process.” He did not specifically cite §807.13(2)(c), which outlines 8 factors a trial court should consider before allowing telephonic testimony. The court of appeals held that T.F.W. forfeited his §807.13(2)(c) argument perhaps without realizing (or perhaps not acknowledging) that the statute was enacted to protect due process rights.

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