On Point: D. Waiver of issues/arguments

State v. Marcos Rosas Villegas, 2018 WI App 9; case activity (including briefs)

This opinion resolves 2 issues worthy of publication and has already generated a petition for review (from an earlier version of the opinion, which was withdrawn and has now been replaced).  According to the court of appeals, an attorney does not perform deficiently by failing to inform his client, an undocumented immigrant, that a plea would render him inadmissible to the U.S. and ineligible for DACA. Furthermore–for the first time–the court of appeals holds that the “guilty plea waiver” rule applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless such a claim is offered as a reason to overturn the plea itself.

Fond du Lac County v. Christy Ann Kasten, 2017AP343, 10/18/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The only real issue in this case is whether the court, in this bench trial, had sufficient evidence to conclude that Kasten had driven within three hours of her blood draw at 10:52 p.m. The court of appeals holds that it did:

State v. Lamont Donnell Sholar, 2016AP987, petition for review granted 10/17/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. When assessing the prejudice of defense counsel’s deficient performance in a multiple-count jury trial, may a court divide the prejudice analysis on a count-by-count basis, finding prejudice warranting relief on some counts from the single trial but not others?

2. If a party fails to file a petition for review following an unfavorable Court of Appeals ruling on a particular argument, may the party re-litigate the same question in a second appeal of the same case?

Rosales-Mireles v. United States, USSC No. 16-9493, cert granted 9/28/17

Question presented:

In United States v. Olano, this Court held that, under the fourth prong of plain error review, “[t]he Court of Appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). To meet that standard, is it necessary, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals required, that the error be one that “would shock the conscience of the common man, serve as a powerful indictment against our system of justice, or seriously call into question the competence or integrity of the district judge?”

State v. Adam M. Zamora, 2016AP1923-CR, District 2, 9/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in determining that an expert witness called to testify about child sexual assault victim reporting behaviors met the so-called Daubert standard codified in § 907.02(1).

State v. Santos Lee Hernandez, 2017AP62-CR, 7/11/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hernandez filed a postconviction motion arguing that he pled guilty to lewd and lascivious behavior while he was drunk–so drunk that he incorrectly told the court that he had not consumed alcohol within the previous 24 hours, that he understood the rights he was waiving, and that there was a factual basis for his plea. In rejecting his claim, the court of appeals commits an error that continues to dog postconviction motions.

Weaver v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 16-240, 2017 WL 2674153 (June 22, 2017); affirming Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495 (Mass. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Members of the public–specifically, Kentel Weaver’s family–were excluded from the overcrowded courtroom during jury selection for his trial. Violations of the Sixth Amendment right to public trial have been called structural errors not susceptible to harmless error analysis. But Weaver’s lawyer didn’t object, so this is an ineffective assistance claim, which of course requires him to show prejudice. But how do you show that you were prejudiced by a structural error–after all, the term refers to an error whose “effect … cannot be ascertained”? United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).

Marquette County v. T.F.W., 2017AP5, 6/8/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

T.F.W. objected to the having his treating psychiatrist testify by telephone at his Chapter 51 extension hearing. He cited both §885.60 and “due process.” He did not specifically cite §807.13(2)(c), which outlines 8 factors a trial court should consider before allowing telephonic testimony. The court of appeals held that T.F.W. forfeited his §807.13(2)(c) argument perhaps without realizing (or perhaps not acknowledging) that the statute was enacted to protect due process rights.

State v. Donald G. Verkuylen, 2016AP2364, 5/18/2017, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Verkuylen pled to refusing a blood draw contrary to the motorboat implied consent law, Wis. Stat. § 30.684. He raises several arguments about the statutorily required warnings, but the court of appeals finds them all either meritless or forfeited.

State v. John A. Augoki, 2016AP231-CR, 4/25/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Augoki raises two claims on appeal of his jury-trial conviction of three sexual assaults: that the jury heard other-acts evidence it should hot have heard (raised here as plain error) and that the court unconstitutionally limited his cross-examination of a state expert. The court of appeals rejects both in a fact-intensive opinion.