On Point: D. Waiver of issues/arguments

State v. Jeremy Joseph Hamilton, 2022AP1350-CR, District 2, 03/01/2023, (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication) case activity

Some readers of this decision might find themselves wondering why there’s no equivalent to baseball’s “tie goes to the runner” rule in criminal appeals. Others might find themselves researching the rule of lenity. However, it turns out there is no such rule in baseball, and the rule of lenity only assists defendants as a canon of statutory construction where a “grievous ambiguity” exists. See State v. Guarnero, 2015 WI 72, ¶26, 363 Wis. 2d 857, 867 N.W.2d 400; see also State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶19, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733 (rejecting a “close case” rule which would favor criminal defendants in breach of plea claims). As the court of appeals puts it: “…this is a very, very close case…[but] even close cases have to be decided one way or another…” (Opinion, ¶14).

Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022AP230, 2/17/23, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Catherine” appeals the extension of her ch. 51 commitment. The recommitment hearing was originally set for a few days before her previous extension would expire. But three days before that scheduled hearing, Catherine requested an independent examination. She, the court, and the county agreed to a “stipulation for temporary extension to commitment” for 60 days. The final hearing was held near the end of this 60 days, 57 days after her commitment had been set to expire before the stipulation.

State v. O.F., 2022AP1703, District 1, 01/18/2023 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Ultimately, the issue addressed by the court of appeals is whether O.F. received ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel was alleged to have “violated his duty of confidentiality and loyalty” to his client. O.F.’s claims were based on multiple statements made by his trial counsel that arguably disclosed confidential information to the court and painted O.F. in a bad light. The court rejects O.F.’s claim primarily because he failed to establish “any prejudice” and also rejects O.F.’s assertions that his IAC claim was structural and thus did not require a post-disposition motion or a Machner evidentiary hearing. (Opinion, ¶¶22-25).

State v. Steven W. Bowers, 2023 WI App 4; case activity (including briefs)

In this important decision addressing a novel Fourth Amendment issue, the court of appeals holds that Bowers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his Dropbox account, despite the fact he (1) used his work email address to create the account and  (2) uploaded case files and shared them without permission. (Opinion, ¶43). The court further holds that although investigators had probable cause to search the account for evidence of Bowers’ alleged crime, no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. (¶3).

State v. Todd W. Vaughn, 2022AP644-Cr, 9/29/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vaughn was convicted of operating a vehicle with a PAC, second offense. He claimed that the deputy who stopped him lacked reasonable suspicion because he acted solely on an uncorroborated anonymous tip. The court of appeals held that the tip provided reasonable suspicion for the stop because  it had “indicia of reliability” that were “suitably corroborated” as required by State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶31, 241
Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106.

State v. Sean B. Day, 2021AP1018, 11/24/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including brief)

Day was initially charged with repeated sexual assault of a child for sexual contact with a 14-year-old when he was 17. He ended up pleading to a single count of fourth-degree sexual assault and was put on probation. The circuit court failed to mention expunction at the sentencing hearing, but later–both in writing and at the postconviction motion hearing–it gave the reasons it did not find expunction appropriate.

State v. Skylard R. Grant, 2020AP404, 7/20/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Grant pleaded to reduced charges on the second day of his trial for homicide, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possessing THC with intent to deliver. He claims his trial lawyer was inadequate in various ways during the trial. The court rejects Grant’s specific claims, but it also rejects the state’s expansive reading of State v. Villegas, 2018 WI App 9, 380 Wis. 2d 246, 908 N.W.2d 198. The state had argued that counsel’s alleged failings were waived by the guilty plea because they did not occur during the actual process of procuring the plea. The court of appeals says Villegas‘s waiver rule is not quite this unforgiving; it clarifies (in accord with Supreme Court case law) that claims of ineffective assistance survive a guilty plea where, “but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty.”

Greer v. United States, USSC No. 19-8709, together with United States v. Gary, USSC No. 20-444, June 14. 2021; Scotusblog pages for Greer and Gary (including links to briefs and commentary)

These two federal felon-in-possession defendants were convicted before Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), which held that, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew he was a felon at the time he possessed a firearm. Thus, they seek relief from their convictions under the onerous plain-error standard. The Court holds they have met their burden.

State v. Jacob Richard Beyer, 2021 WI 59, 6/15/21, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

On Point is proud to present a guest post by Tom Aquino of the Madison appellate office:

State v. Douglas J. Richer, 2019AP2024, 5/18/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Douglas Richer was charged in two related cases in two counties; he reached a deal with the state wherein he’d plead to just one count in Eau Claire and there’d be a joint sentencing recommendation. The plea colloquy was a thorough one; Richer expressed dissatisfaction about various aspects of the prosecution but made it very clear that he wanted to plead no-contest. After a number of clarifications the circuit court eventually accepted the plea and found Richer guilty. During sentencing (which was part of the same hearing as the plea), the prosecutor and the court took umbrage at some of Mr. Richer’s statements and, at the state’s suggestion, the court said it was “withdrawing” Richer’s plea. Richer and his counsel objected, both at that hearing and in a later written motion, but to no avail. Richer eventually entered a much less favorable bargain and received a sentence substantially longer than the one the parties had agreed to recommend.