On Point blog, page 5 of 25
Parent forfeited challenges to competency and jurisdiction in TPR appeal by not objecting to defective service
State v. I.B., 2022AP911 & 2022AP912, District I, 6/6/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (briefs not available)
Although the State appears to have conceded it did not follow the statutory requirements for proper service of the petition(s) in this TPR, Ivy’s appeal fails because she did not object below. And, because the error could have been cured if counsel had objected, her ineffectiveness claim also fails.
Defense win! TPR court lost competency by holding dispo hearing immediately after default and waiver of counsel finding
State v. R.A.M., 2023AP441, 6/6/23, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); petition for review granted 9/26/23; affirmed 6/25/24 case activity
R.A.M. was defaulted on grounds after she missed a single hearing. While the “hearing” was the fourth day of her TPR court trial, she had appeared at every prior hearing, including the first three days of trial. As all too commonly happens, the circuit court determined that R.A.M.’s single non-appearance was “egregious and in bad faith and without justification” without ever hearing from her, and held that she had waived her right to counsel under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. The court of appeals notes the paucity of grounds for this decision in a footnote, but as R.A.M. doesn’t challenge the finding of egregiousness, the opinion doesn’t otherwise address it. It does address what came next: rather than waiting the two days the same statute requires to hold a dispositional hearing after a counsel waiver, the court held the hearing on the same day and terminated R.A.M.’s rights.
SCOW to decide whether to relax strict application of statutory substitution deadline
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Antonio S. Davis v. Circuit Court for Dane County and Honorable Ellen K. Berz, 2022AP1999-W, PFR granted 03/31/2023; COA decision affirmed, 2024 WI 14, case activity (including briefs, petition for review, and state’s response)
Davis was arrested and charged with two misdemeanors in Dane County. He applied for an attorney through the State Public Defender a day after his arrest, but made his initial appearance before a court commissioner without appointed trial counsel. That same day, Davis’ case was assigned to Judge Ellen K. Berz. Counsel was appointed to represent Davis 65 days later, and after consultation with his newly appointed counsel, Davis filed a request for substitution. Judge Berz denied the request as “untimely.” The supreme court will now review whether the delayed appointment of counsel provides an exception to the strict adherence to Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4)’s deadline to file a request for substitution.
Unanimous SCOW holds that state “cured” plea breach and reverses COA order for resentencing
State v. Robert K. Nietzold, Sr., 2023 WI 22, 03/28/2023, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the state agreed to “not recommend a specific term of imprisonment.” At sentencing, the state argued for 27 years imprisonment, consisting of 12 years initial confinement and 15 years extended supervision. Nietzold objected, was denied a postconviction motion hearing in the circuit court, but the court of appeals reversed and ordered resentencing before a different judge. Now, a unanimous Wisconsin Supreme Court holds that the state “cured” its undisputed material and substantial breach because the prosecutor “acknowledged the blunder and modified the State’s recommendation to an undefined prison term-exactly what Nietzold agreed to.” (Opinion, ¶14).
Prosecutor who claimed to be “ethically bound” to recommend probation despite “changed landscape” did not breach plea agreement
State v. Jeremy Joseph Hamilton, 2022AP1350-CR, District 2, 03/01/2023, (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication) case activity
Some readers of this decision might find themselves wondering why there’s no equivalent to baseball’s “tie goes to the runner” rule in criminal appeals. Others might find themselves researching the rule of lenity. However, it turns out there is no such rule in baseball, and the rule of lenity only assists defendants as a canon of statutory construction where a “grievous ambiguity” exists. See State v. Guarnero, 2015 WI 72, ¶26, 363 Wis. 2d 857, 867 N.W.2d 400; see also State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶19, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733 (rejecting a “close case” rule which would favor criminal defendants in breach of plea claims). As the court of appeals puts it: “…this is a very, very close case…[but] even close cases have to be decided one way or another…” (Opinion, ¶14).
COA holds challenge to late ch. 51 extension hearing judicially estopped; says hearsay statements not plain error
Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022AP230, 2/17/23, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
“Catherine” appeals the extension of her ch. 51 commitment. The recommitment hearing was originally set for a few days before her previous extension would expire. But three days before that scheduled hearing, Catherine requested an independent examination. She, the court, and the county agreed to a “stipulation for temporary extension to commitment” for 60 days. The final hearing was held near the end of this 60 days, 57 days after her commitment had been set to expire before the stipulation.
COA affirms TPR order and holds that claimed structural error requires post-disposition motion and Machner hearing
State v. O.F., 2022AP1703, District 1, 01/18/2023 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Ultimately, the issue addressed by the court of appeals is whether O.F. received ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel was alleged to have “violated his duty of confidentiality and loyalty” to his client. O.F.’s claims were based on multiple statements made by his trial counsel that arguably disclosed confidential information to the court and painted O.F. in a bad light. The court rejects O.F.’s claim primarily because he failed to establish “any prejudice” and also rejects O.F.’s assertions that his IAC claim was structural and thus did not require a post-disposition motion or a Machner evidentiary hearing. (Opinion, ¶¶22-25).
Defense Win! COA upholds suppression of evidence obtained from defendant’s Dropbox account
State v. Steven W. Bowers, 2023 WI App 4; case activity (including briefs)
In this important decision addressing a novel Fourth Amendment issue, the court of appeals holds that Bowers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his Dropbox account, despite the fact he (1) used his work email address to create the account and (2) uploaded case files and shared them without permission. (Opinion, ¶43). The court further holds that although investigators had probable cause to search the account for evidence of Bowers’ alleged crime, no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. (¶3).
Anonymous tip provided reasonable suspicion for traffic stop
State v. Todd W. Vaughn, 2022AP644-Cr, 9/29/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Vaughn was convicted of operating a vehicle with a PAC, second offense. He claimed that the deputy who stopped him lacked reasonable suspicion because he acted solely on an uncorroborated anonymous tip. The court of appeals held that the tip provided reasonable suspicion for the stop because it had “indicia of reliability” that were “suitably corroborated” as required by State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶31, 241
Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106.
Court of appeals excuses state’s failure to file any brief; upholds denial of expunction
State v. Sean B. Day, 2021AP1018, 11/24/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including brief)
Day was initially charged with repeated sexual assault of a child for sexual contact with a 14-year-old when he was 17. He ended up pleading to a single count of fourth-degree sexual assault and was put on probation. The circuit court failed to mention expunction at the sentencing hearing, but later–both in writing and at the postconviction motion hearing–it gave the reasons it did not find expunction appropriate.