On Point blog, page 1 of 2
COA rejects challenges to possession of child porn based on erroneous jury instruction and state’s closing argument
State v. Catherine E. Edwards, 2023AP1042-CR, 3/6/25, District IV (not recommended for publication); case activity
Edwards’s appeal focuses on the definition of “lewd exhibition of intimate parts” and the state’s closing arguments as to child pornography. COA rejects Edwards’s arguments on appeal and affirms her convictions for possession of child pornography.
COA rejects challenges to jury instructions: one good route to conviction is enough
State v. Dreama F. Harvey, 2022 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)
A jury convicted Harvey of reckless homicide by the delivery of heroin. On appeal, she notes that the jury instructions would have permitted conviction on the theory that she either aided and abetted another supplier or was part of the chain of distribution–that is, that she supplied the person who actually sold the heroin to the decedent. But there was no evidence she’d done any of those things: if she’d committed the crime, all the evidence showed that it was by selling the heroin directly to the buyer, who ingested it and died. The verdict forms were general: the jury was asked only to determine guilt or innocence, not whether Harvey was the principal, an aider, or a higher-up in the chain. So, Harvey says, we can’t know whether the jury convicted her based on one of the other two theories for which there was no evidence, and her conviction must be reversed.
SCOTUS: Governor setting meetings, calls, events in exchange for gifts not illegal
McDonnell v. United States, USSC No. 15-474, 2016 WL 3461561 (June 27, 2016), reversing United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
While he was governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell, along with his wife, accepted gifts and favors worth about $175,000 from a businessman who was trying to get the state medical schools to run studies on a nutritional supplement his company had developed. As discussed in our post on the cert grant, a jury convicted McDonnell of various honest services fraud and extortion counts in relation to various actions he undertook related to the supplement, including arranging and attending meetings with other government officials about the supplement and hosting a private lunch with the businessman at which checks were given to university researchers.
Any error in excusing juror or allowing notes during closing harmless
State v. Jesus C. Gonzalez, 2015AP784-CR, 3/8/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Gonzalez raises two challenges to his conviction, at jury trial, of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment. The court of appeals finds any error harmless.
How to beat the “harmless error” rap
For the 2015 SPD conference, Judge Sankovitz and Attorneys Rob Henak and Melinda Swartz prepared an excellent outline on a problem that plagues many defense lawyers on appeal. They have a great issue. They win it, but then the court of appeals or supreme court finds the error harmless. This detailed, well-researched outline walks you through the history of the “harmless error” doctrine and offers ideas for how to beat it in various situations.
State v. Rory A. McKellips, 2014AP827-CR, petition for review granted 11/16/15
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
In this case the supreme court will address an important issue about the offense of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime, § 948.075(1r). The court of appeals granted McKellips a new trial on a charge under that statute, holding the jury was erroneously instructed to decide whether McKellips’s cell phone constituted a “computerized communication system” when it should have been instructed to decide whether McKellips’s uses of the phone constituted communication via a “computerized communication system.” The supreme court might also address another issue that has implications beyond § 948.075: Namely, whether instructional error that isn’t objected to at trial can be a basis for a new trial in the interest of justice.
Failure to require jury to decide whether conduct qualified for sentence enhancer was error and prejudiced defendant
State v. Lonel L. Johnson, Jr., 2014AP2888-CR, District 3, 9/15/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity
High fives for the defense! The domestic abuse repeater enhancer applied to this defendant increased his maximum penalty for the charged offense. Thus, the court of appeals held (and the State conceded) that the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his underlying conduct qualified as an act of domestic abuse. That’s what Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) requires, but it didn’t happen here. The real win, however, is that for once the State did NOT prevail on its claim of harmless error!!
SCOW: Jury instruction that describes a legal theory not supported by the evidence is subject to harmless error analysis
State v. Maltese Lavele Williams, 2015 WI 75, 7/10/15; majority by Prosser: concurrence by Abrahamson; on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
All jury instruction errors are to be assessed for whether the error was harmless, the supreme court declares, including errors describing a theory of criminal culpability that was not presented to the jury or omitting a valid theory that was presented to the jury. The court therefore abrogates State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), which held that a jury instruction accurately setting out a legal basis for liability that does not fit evidence presented at trial should be assessed for whether the evidence was sufficient to support the basis for liability in the instruction.
Wisconsin Supreme Court: Jury instruction that added a requirement for proof that is not in the statutes was harmless error
State v. Courtney C. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, on review of published court of appeals decision; case activity; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack
Beamon was tried for fleeing an officer under § 346.04(3), which requires proof that the person knowingly fled or attempted to elude an officer in one of three ways: 1) by willful or wanton disregard of a visible or audible signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the police officer or other vehicles or pedestrians;
Fleeing, § 346.04(3): Elements; Instructions, “Law of the Case”: As Measure of State’s Proof – Harmless Error
State v. Courtney C. Beamon, 2011 WI App 131 (recommended for publication); for Beamon: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; petition for review granted, 4/25/12
Fleeing, § 346.04(3) – Elements
¶4 …. In State v. Sterzinger, 2002 WI App 171, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 925, 649 N.W.2d 677, this court separated the language of § 346.04(3) into segments: (1) No operator of a vehicle,