On Point blog, page 10 of 17
Denial of motion to suppress confession, which led to guilty plea, deemed harmless error
State v. Trenton James Dawson, 2013AP834-Cr, District 1, 12/3/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This decision points up a problem in Wisconsin case law: How does an appellate court analyze “harmless error” in a situation where the trial court denies a motion to suppress a defendant’s confession, which then causes him to plead guilty?
Police interrogated Dawson for 30-45 minutes in the back of a squad car about his friend’s death.
Wisconsin Supreme Court: Jury instruction that added a requirement for proof that is not in the statutes was harmless error
State v. Courtney C. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, on review of published court of appeals decision; case activity; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack
Beamon was tried for fleeing an officer under § 346.04(3), which requires proof that the person knowingly fled or attempted to elude an officer in one of three ways: 1) by willful or wanton disregard of a visible or audible signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the police officer or other vehicles or pedestrians;
Wisconsin Supreme Court: Sentencing based on inaccurate information is not structural error, but mistake about mandatory minimum penalty in this case was not harmless
State v. Lamont L. Travis, 2013 WI 38, affirming published court of appeals decision, 2012 WI App 46, 340 Wis. 2d 639, 813 N.W.2d 702; case activity
¶9 The question of law presented to this court is whether a circuit court’s imposition of a sentence using inaccurate information that the defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum five-year period of confinement is structural error or subject to the application of harmless error analysis….
Discretion of trial court — evidentiary decisions; mistrial motions
State v. Desmond Dejuan Laster, 2012AP1739-CR, District 1, 4/2/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in making two evidentiary rulings or in denying Laster’s motion for a mistrial.
On the first evidentiary ruling, the court of appeals holds the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to ask Hunt, a defense witness,
Right to trial by impartial jury – seating of juror not actually summoned
State v. Jacob Turner, 2013 WI App 23; case activity
Addressing an unusual set of facts, the court of appeals holds Turner’s constitutional rights to an impartial jury and due process were not violated by the seating of a juror who had not been summoned for service and who did not disclose that to the court.
A summons for jury duty was sent to “John P.
Even if trial court erred in allowing use of evidence disclosed on eve of trial, the error was harmless
State v. Tavoris A. Murphy, Sr., 2012AP505-CR, District 4, 2/28/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Murphy argues the circuit court erred when it found good cause for the state’s late disclosure of a letter written by the defendant and ruled the letter would be admissible as rebuttal evidence. (¶¶1, 20, 22). The letter was written to DeKeyser, a defense witness, and outlined DeKeyser’s testimony.
Admission of other-acts evidence—harmless error
State v. Andrew J. Wirth, 2012AP208-CR, District 4, 2/21/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Wirth was charged with the shooting deaths of two people outside a bar. He claimed self defense. The trial court allowed evidence that Wirth engaged in a confrontation earlier in the evening at a different bar with someone other than the shooting victims. In a fact-intensive opinion, the court of appeals concludes that if admission of the evidence was error,
State v. Travis J. Seaton, 2012AP918 / State v. Nancy J. Pinno, 2011AP2424-CR, District 2, 12/5/12
court of appeals certification request; certification granted 2/25/13; case activity (Seaton); case activity (Pinno)
Issue Presented (from Certification):
Is the failure to object to the closure of a public trial to be analyzed upon appellate review under the “forfeiture standard” or the “waiver standard”?
As suggested, in each of these consolidated cases the trial judge barred the public from the courtroom (during jury selection in each instance),
TPR – Meaningful Cross-Examination, § 906.11(1)
La Crosse Co. DHS v. Kristle S., 2012AP2005, District 4, 11/21/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The parent was given a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the social worker with respect to conditions for the children’s return, in that the trial court permitted extensive questioning on these issues before instructing counsel to pursue a different line of questioning:
¶17 Our review of the record also demonstrates that Kristle had a meaningful opportunity to impeach Simmons’ credibility.
State v. Lamont L. Travis, 2012 WI App 46, WSC review granted 9/14/12
on review of published decision; case activity
Issue (composed by on Point)
Whether sentencing reliance on inaccurate information (here, misapprehension of mandatory minimum incarceration) is structural error.
Travis pleaded guilty to an offense that all concerned (defense, prosecution, sentencing court) wrongly thought carried a 5-year mandatory minimum (largely due to confusion about the particular offense Travis pleaded to). The court of appeals clarified that the offense of conviction in fact had no mandatory minimum.