On Point: L. Harmless Error

State v. Dhosi J. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, affirming 2007 WI App 268
For Ndina: Richard L. Kaiser

Issue/Holding:

¶43      If a defendant’s right to a public trial is determined to have been violated, the defendant need not show prejudice; the doctrine of harmless error does not apply to structural errors. [15]

 [15]  See Neder v.

State v. Donald W. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, reversing unpublished decision
For Jorgensen: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶21      Wisconsin Stat. § 901.03(4) (2003-04) recognizes the plain error doctrine. [3] The plain error doctrine allows appellate courts to review errors that were otherwise waived by a party’s failure to object.  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78,

State v. Charles W. Mark, 2008 WI App 44; on appeal following remand in State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, 292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90
For Mark: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶57      In summary, while the termination from the community treatment program and the rule violation were presented as conduct that, along with the hotel incident,

State v. Ronell E. Harris, 2008 WI 15, affirming unpublished decision
For Harris: Ralph J. Sczygelskis

Issue/Holding: Various discovery and evidentiary violations amounted to harmless error, whether taken singly (¶¶41-59, ¶87-90) or cumulatively (¶¶109-113).Harmless error discussions are largely fact-specific, and this case is no exception. But it is noteworthy for its recognition that the “court has formulated the test for harmless or prejudicial error in a variety of way,” ¶42.

State v. William Troy Ford, 2007 WI 138, affirming unpublished decision
For Ford: Ralph J. Sczygelski

Issue/Holding

¶42      … (S)tructural error [is] a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); State v. Shirley E.

State v. Thomas S. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, affirming unpublished opinion
For Mayo: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶47      In determining whether a constitutional error is harmless, the inquiry is as follows: “‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’” State v. Harvey,

State v. Thomas S. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, affirming unpublished opinion
For Mayo: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding: Erroneous comments on pre-Miranda silence were harmless, given both infrequency of occurrence and also absence of impact on the defendant’s decision to testify (which then properly exposed him to such comment), ¶¶49-52.

State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31
For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger

Issue/Holding: Instructional error due to mandatory conclusive presumption wasn’t harmless:

¶28      As we have explained, the trial error consisted of an instruction that the jury must accept as true the elemental facts that Schultz acted inconsistently with the duties of her office and intended to obtain a dishonest disadvantage if the jury found that Schultz used state resources to promote a candidate or to raise money for political campaign purposes. 

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55
For Shirley E.: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶63      Depriving a parent of the statutory right to counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding deprives the parent of a basic protection without which, according to our legislature, a termination of a parental rights proceeding cannot reliably serve its function.

State v. Quentrell E. Williams, 2006 WI App 212
For Williams: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: ¶23, n.5:

 Williams also contends that the evidence was relevant to whether he intentionally caused harm to A.B.A. because intentional child abuse is a specific intent crime. However, Williams was acquitted of intentionally causing harm to a child. Thus, he cannot show that he was prejudiced in his defense as to intentionally causing harm to a child by his attorney’s failure to introduce that evidence.