On Point: L. Harmless Error

State v. Jesus C. Gonzalez, 2015AP784-CR, 3/8/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Gonzalez raises two challenges to his conviction, at jury trial, of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment. The court of appeals finds any error harmless.

City of Milwaukee v. D.S., 2015AP1634, 2/2/16, District 1 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.S., a juvenile, was ordered to register as a sex offender for life. On appeal, he argued that the circuit court relied on two types of inaccurate information: (1) a report, prepared by Dr. Paul Hesse, regarding the recidivism rate for juvenile sex offenders at Lincoln Hills, and (2) misinformation about the meaning of D.S.’s JSOAP-II scores.  He lost on both counts.

For the 2015 SPD conference, Judge Sankovitz and Attorneys Rob Henak and Melinda Swartz prepared an excellent outline on a problem that plagues many defense lawyers on appeal.  They have a great issue. They win it, but then the court of appeals or supreme court finds the error harmless.  This detailed, well-researched outline walks you through the history of the “harmless error” doctrine and offers ideas for how to beat it in various situations.  

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

In this case the supreme court will address an important issue about the offense of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime, § 948.075(1r). The court of appeals granted McKellips a new trial on a charge under that statute, holding the jury was erroneously instructed to decide whether McKellips’s cell phone constituted a “computerized communication system” when it should have been instructed to decide whether McKellips’s uses of the phone constituted communication via a “computerized communication system.” The supreme court might also address another issue that has implications beyond § 948.075: Namely, whether instructional error that isn’t objected to at trial can be a basis for a new trial in the interest of justice.

Percell Dansberry v. Randy Pfister, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-3723, 9/15/15

The judge who took Dansberry’s guilty plea understated the mandatory minimum sentence Dansberry faced, and therefore Dansberry’s plea was not entered with a full understanding of the consequences, as required under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). But the Supreme Court has not held Boykin errors to be structural, so the state court’s rejection of his plea withdrawal motion on harmless error grounds was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Review of an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (copied from the State’s PFR here):

Crimes may be joined in one trial if they are similar or if they are connected as part of a common plan. Here, the court of appeals reversed Salinas’ conviction because it decided allegations that he sexually assaulted his girlfriend’s child, and that he intimidated his girlfriend and her child, were not similar acts or connected as part of a common plan. Is the court of appeals’ decision in conflict with the well-established rule that joinder of charges must be broadly construed?

Improper joinder is subject to harmless error review. Here, the evidence of sexual assault and victim intimidation was overhwleming. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that the joinder of the charges was not harmless?

State v. Lonel L. Johnson, Jr., 2014AP2888-CR, District 3, 9/15/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

High fives for the defense! The domestic abuse repeater enhancer applied to this defendant increased his maximum penalty for the charged offense. Thus, the court of appeals held (and the State conceded) that the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his underlying conduct qualified as an act of domestic abuse. That’s what Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) requires, but it didn’t happen here.  The real win, however, is that for once the State did NOT prevail on its claim of harmless error!!

Mark D. Jensen v. Marc Clements, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1380, 9/8/15, affirming Jensen v. Schwochert, No. 11-C-0803 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013)

At Jensen’s trial for the murder of his wife Julie the State introduced Julie’s handwritten letter to the police, written two weeks before her death, in which she wrote she would never take her life and that her husband should be the suspect if anything should happen to her. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals assumed the admission of the letter violated Jensen’s right to confrontation but found the error harmless. The Seventh Circuit holds that the court of appeals’ decision was an unreasonable application of the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error standard, and that the erroneous admission of the hearsay evidence had a substantial and injurious influence or effect in determining the jury’s verdict, thus satisfying the actual prejudice standard under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

State v. Maltese Lavele Williams, 2015 WI 75, 7/10/15; majority by Prosser: concurrence by Abrahamson; on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

All jury instruction errors are to be assessed for whether the error was harmless, the supreme court declares, including errors describing a theory of criminal culpability that was not presented to the jury or omitting a valid theory that was presented to the jury. The court therefore abrogates State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), which held that a jury instruction accurately setting out a legal basis for liability that does not fit evidence presented at trial should be assessed for whether the evidence was sufficient to support the basis for liability in the instruction.

State v. Zoltan M. Peter, 2014AP1589-CR, 1/1/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); click here for briefs and docket

Peter was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his blood. He moved to suppress the marijuana that the police seized from his car, arguably in violation of the plainharm view doctrine and lost. The court of appeals found the argument baffling.