On Point blog, page 8 of 17
Failure to require jury to decide whether conduct qualified for sentence enhancer was error and prejudiced defendant
State v. Lonel L. Johnson, Jr., 2014AP2888-CR, District 3, 9/15/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity
High fives for the defense! The domestic abuse repeater enhancer applied to this defendant increased his maximum penalty for the charged offense. Thus, the court of appeals held (and the State conceded) that the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his underlying conduct qualified as an act of domestic abuse. That’s what Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) requires, but it didn’t happen here. The real win, however, is that for once the State did NOT prevail on its claim of harmless error!!
Seventh Circuit affirms grant of habeas relief, finds harmless error analysis done by Wisconsin Court of Appeals to be unreasonable
Mark D. Jensen v. Marc Clements, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1380, 9/8/15, affirming Jensen v. Schwochert, No. 11-C-0803 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013)
At Jensen’s trial for the murder of his wife Julie the State introduced Julie’s handwritten letter to the police, written two weeks before her death, in which she wrote she would never take her life and that her husband should be the suspect if anything should happen to her. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals assumed the admission of the letter violated Jensen’s right to confrontation but found the error harmless. The Seventh Circuit holds that the court of appeals’ decision was an unreasonable application of the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error standard, and that the erroneous admission of the hearsay evidence had a substantial and injurious influence or effect in determining the jury’s verdict, thus satisfying the actual prejudice standard under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
SCOW: Jury instruction that describes a legal theory not supported by the evidence is subject to harmless error analysis
State v. Maltese Lavele Williams, 2015 WI 75, 7/10/15; majority by Prosser: concurrence by Abrahamson; on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
All jury instruction errors are to be assessed for whether the error was harmless, the supreme court declares, including errors describing a theory of criminal culpability that was not presented to the jury or omitting a valid theory that was presented to the jury. The court therefore abrogates State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), which held that a jury instruction accurately setting out a legal basis for liability that does not fit evidence presented at trial should be assessed for whether the evidence was sufficient to support the basis for liability in the instruction.
Suppression of marijuana irrelevant to conviction for operating with detectable amount of THC in blood
State v. Zoltan M. Peter, 2014AP1589-CR, 1/1/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); click here for briefs and docket
Peter was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his blood. He moved to suppress the marijuana that the police seized from his car, arguably in violation of the plainharm view doctrine and lost. The court of appeals found the argument baffling.
SCOW holds defendant may forfeit constitutional right to testify at trial
State v. Eddie Lee Anthony, 2015 WI 20, affirming unpublished COA decision; click here for docket and briefs
Resolving an issue of first impression, SCOW has decided that a defendant may forfeit his constitutional right to testify by stating an intent to bring up irrelevant matters or by engaging in conduct incompatible with the assertion of that right. Also, the erroneous denial of the right to testify is subject to a harmless error analysis–even where the record shows the defendant would testify to both relevant and irrelevant matters.
Homicide conviction affirmed based on harmless error
State v. Eduardo Ivanez, 2013AP1901-CR, 2/26/15, District 1 (not recommended for publication); click here for briefs
Ivanez appealed his conviction for 1st-degree intentional homicide and hiding a corpse on the grounds that statements he made to the police should have been suppressed and the admission of those statements impelled him to testify that he killed the victim in self-defense, a dubious trial strategy. The court of appeals assumed, without deciding, that the trial court had erred but affirmed under the harmless error doctrine.
SCOW: Judge shouldn’t have presided over case after being substituted under § 971.20, and error isn’t harmless
State v. Richard Harrison, 2015 WI 5, 1/22/15, affirming a summary disposition of the court of appeals; opinion by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity
The supreme court unanimously holds that a circuit judge erred by presiding over Harrison’s trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions after Harrison filed a timely and proper § 971.20 request for substitution of the judge, the request was granted, and a new judge was appointed. The court rejects the state’s claims that Harrison forfeited his right to substitution and that any error was harmless.
Voir dire questions by prosecutor that elicited promise to convict if elements were proven did not deny right to jury trial
State v. Frank M. Zdzieblowski, 2014 WI App 130; case activity
The prosecutor during voir dire elicited a promise from prospective jurors that they would convict if the State proved the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and then reminded the jurors of that promise in his rebuttal closing argument. The court of appeals holds the prosecutor’s unobjected-to voir dire questioning and rebuttal closing argument neither rose to the level of plain error nor warranted a new trial in the interest of justice.
Excluding impeachment testimony from witness’s attorney was harmless
State v. Anthony E. Henderson, 2013AP2515, District 1, 10/7/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
If the trial court erred in excluding a witness’s attorney from testifying to information that would have impeached the witness, that error was harmless.
Joinder of sexual assault claims and admission of evidence showing change in victim’s personality upheld
State v. John M. Lattimore, 2013AP911-CR, District 4, 9/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Lattimore was convicted of 2nd-degree sexual assault with use of force and false imprisonment against S.M. He appealed trial court decisions to: (1) join a count of 3rd-degree sexual assault against a different victim, M.H., to S.M.’s trial, (2) exclude the text of a Facebook message sent by S.M.’s brother to the defendant right after the assault, and (3) admit testimony about S.M.’s personality change after the assault. He had no luck with the court of appeals.