On Point: 1. Appeals

State v. Robert K. Nietzold, Sr., 2023 WI 22, 03/28/2023, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the state agreed to “not recommend a specific term of imprisonment.” At sentencing, the state argued for 27 years imprisonment, consisting of 12 years initial confinement and 15 years extended supervision. Nietzold objected, was denied a postconviction motion hearing in the circuit court, but the court of appeals reversed and ordered resentencing before a different judge. Now, a unanimous Wisconsin Supreme Court holds that the state “cured” its undisputed material and substantial breach because the prosecutor “acknowledged the blunder and modified the State’s recommendation to an undefined prison term-exactly what Nietzold agreed to.” (Opinion, ¶14).

Waukesha County DHHS v. M.A.S., 2022AP877, District 2, 3/22/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.B. (Rose), a daughter of M.A.S. (Mary), filed an appeal of an order granting the County’s petition for a protective placement of Mary. The court of appeals holds Rose doesn’t have standing to appeal the order.

State v. Jeremy Joseph Hamilton, 2022AP1350-CR, District 2, 03/01/2023, (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication) case activity

Some readers of this decision might find themselves wondering why there’s no equivalent to baseball’s “tie goes to the runner” rule in criminal appeals. Others might find themselves researching the rule of lenity. However, it turns out there is no such rule in baseball, and the rule of lenity only assists defendants as a canon of statutory construction where a “grievous ambiguity” exists. See State v. Guarnero, 2015 WI 72, ¶26, 363 Wis. 2d 857, 867 N.W.2d 400; see also State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶19, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733 (rejecting a “close case” rule which would favor criminal defendants in breach of plea claims). As the court of appeals puts it: “…this is a very, very close case…[but] even close cases have to be decided one way or another…” (Opinion, ¶14).

Kenosha County v. A.C.S., 2022AP1821-1825, 2/15/23, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Here’s a fact pattern one hopes doesn’t come up too often. The county sought the termination of “Anna’s” parental rights to five children. It then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that she’d been convicted of a serious felony related to the death of another child. A hearing was set, but Anna’s counsel informed the court she’d be in trial in a homicide case. Expecting an adjournment–which both trial counsel and the court of appeals note is “common practice” in such a situation–the attorney told Anna the hearing would be put off. Counsel’s homicide trial then unexpectedly ended early, though she still had work to do to wrap it up. The TPR court apparently heard through the grapevine that the homicide trial was over. Without any successful contact–or much apparent effort to contact–Anna or her lawyer, the court held the scheduled hearing ex parte and, at the county’s request, granted summary judgment. Later, over Anna and her counsel’s protestations, the court terminated her rights.

Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022AP230, 2/17/23, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Catherine” appeals the extension of her ch. 51 commitment. The recommitment hearing was originally set for a few days before her previous extension would expire. But three days before that scheduled hearing, Catherine requested an independent examination. She, the court, and the county agreed to a “stipulation for temporary extension to commitment” for 60 days. The final hearing was held near the end of this 60 days, 57 days after her commitment had been set to expire before the stipulation.

State v. Craig R. Thatcher, 2020AP1734, 2/7/23, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs).

A state trooper stopped Thatcher for a suspected OWI, the trooper read the Informing the Accused Form, and, according to Thatcher, provided additional, misleading information that influenced his decision to consent to a breath test in violation of County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 280, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995). The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision to suppress the results of the breath test and also the results of the subsequent blood.

N.D. v. E.S., 2022AP1084, District 2, 01/25/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Nancy (N.D.) petitioned to terminate Ed’s (E.D.’s) parental rights on the grounds that he abandoned their daughter, Kim. See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1). At trial, Ed asserted a “good cause” defense that Nancy prevented him from having contact with Kim, and in response, Nancy was allowed to testify that the reason for her interference was Ed’s  “heroin use.” Despite the fact that Nancy had no personal knowledge of Ed’s suspected heroin use, the circuit court ruled, and the court of appeals agrees, that the fact that Ed admitted to being drug tested was sufficient foundation for Nancy’s testimony. As a result, Ed’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to this evidence fails.

State v. O.F., 2022AP1703, District 1, 01/18/2023 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Ultimately, the issue addressed by the court of appeals is whether O.F. received ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel was alleged to have “violated his duty of confidentiality and loyalty” to his client. O.F.’s claims were based on multiple statements made by his trial counsel that arguably disclosed confidential information to the court and painted O.F. in a bad light. The court rejects O.F.’s claim primarily because he failed to establish “any prejudice” and also rejects O.F.’s assertions that his IAC claim was structural and thus did not require a post-disposition motion or a Machner evidentiary hearing. (Opinion, ¶¶22-25).

State v. E.B., 2022AP1882, District 1, 01/18/2023 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication), case activity

This case concerns only the disposition phase of E.B.’s TPR case. She argued that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion with regard to the best interest of the child factors set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3).  Specifically, E.B. argued that the circuit court did not give her own testimony enough weight and gave too much weight to the foster mother’s testimony. However, E.B. does not argue that the circuit court failed to consider any specific factor or made clearly erroneous findings based on the evidence presented at disposition. Because circuit courts retain discretion to regarding “the weight assigned to each factor and the credibility assigned to each witness’s testimony,” the court affirms the TPR order. (Opinion, ¶15).

State v. Jeffrey W. Butler, 2021AP2212-CR, 1/11/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At Butler’s restitution hearing, the circuit court expressed frustration and disappointment that neither party presented any documentation regarding a disputed restitution claim. The court stated, “I have nothing other than testimony saying [the victim’s] done all this stuff and Googled it and she doesn’t bring in any receipts.” The court continued: “Nothing, I have nothing…[s]o the court is left with, based on testimony, what’s a reasonable amount of restitution…” The court then concluded, “I’ll put $500 toward clothing.” Butler appealed and the court of appeals affirms, holding that the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support the restitution award.