On Point blog, page 40 of 117
SCOTUS delves into structural error
Weaver v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 16-240, 2017 WL 2674153 (June 22, 2017); affirming Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495 (Mass. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Members of the public–specifically, Kentel Weaver’s family–were excluded from the overcrowded courtroom during jury selection for his trial. Violations of the Sixth Amendment right to public trial have been called structural errors not susceptible to harmless error analysis. But Weaver’s lawyer didn’t object, so this is an ineffective assistance claim, which of course requires him to show prejudice. But how do you show that you were prejudiced by a structural error–after all, the term refers to an error whose “effect … cannot be ascertained”? United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).
Evidence that victim was shot exactly 1 year after defendant’s brother was shot and killed deemed admissible
State v. Tyshun DeMichael Young, 2016AP657-CR, 6/20/17, District 1; (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A jury convicted Young of attempted 1st-degree intentional homicide and 1st degree recklessly-endangering safety with use of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, he argued that the trial court should not have permitted the jury to hear evidence that his younger brother was killed exactly one year prior to the date he allegedly shot the victims in this case.
Court of appeals rejects numerous challenges to homicide conviction
State v. Ron Joseph Allen, 2016AP885, 6/13/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A jury convicted Ron Allen of first-degree intentional homicide as party to the crime. He raises various challenges to the conviction and sentence of life without extended supervision, but the court of appeals rejects them all.
Issues, arguments, and objecting to telephonic testimony
Marquette County v. T.F.W., 2017AP5, 6/8/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
T.F.W. objected to the having his treating psychiatrist testify by telephone at his Chapter 51 extension hearing. He cited both §885.60 and “due process.” He did not specifically cite §807.13(2)(c), which outlines 8 factors a trial court should consider before allowing telephonic testimony. The court of appeals held that T.F.W. forfeited his §807.13(2)(c) argument perhaps without realizing (or perhaps not acknowledging) that the statute was enacted to protect due process rights.
DHS’s transfer of NGI acquittee to DOC custody violated circuit court’s commitment order
State v. Bruce C. Brenizer, 2015AP2181, District 3, 6/6/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including select briefs)
The Department of Health Services didn’t have authority to transfer Brenizer to the Department of Corrections because the circuit court’s commitment order unambiguously states that Brenizer is committed to DHS custody for life unless his custody is terminated under § 971.17(5) (1991-92).
Court of appeals rejects challenges to motorboat implied consent citation
State v. Donald G. Verkuylen, 2016AP2364, 5/18/2017, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Verkuylen pled to refusing a blood draw contrary to the motorboat implied consent law, Wis. Stat. § 30.684. He raises several arguments about the statutorily required warnings, but the court of appeals finds them all either meritless or forfeited.
SCOW to address ineffective assistance of counsel and allowing client to appear in prison garb at Chapter 51 trial
Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order has a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel where his lawyer fails to object to, prevent the admission of, or request a curative instruction to address, evidence of his prisoner status during his jury trial?
Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice where the jury repeatedly sees and hears evidence of his prisoner status?
Abrahamson criticizes Wisconsin Supreme Court’s “untoward dismissal” of fully briefed and argued case, offers advice on preserving issues
Maya Elaine Smith v. Jeff Anderson, 2017 WI 43, dismissing a petition for review of 366 Wis. 2d 808, 874 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 2016)(unpublished); case activity (including briefs)
Recently, SCOW has marched ahead and decided issues that the parties did not properly preserve or brief–to the detriment of indigent defendants. Recall what happened a few weeks ago in State v. Denny and earlier in State v. Sulla and State v. Smith. But in this case, after briefing and argument by the parties and an amicus curiae, a 3-justice majority (Ziegler and RG Bradley didn’t participate) showed remarkable restraint. It issued a per curiam opinion dismissing a petition for review as improvidently granted because nobody preserved an issue the court of appeals declined to decide. The upshot? It appears that SCOW has rescued West Bend Mutual Insurance Company from an appellate blunder and possible defeat. The blunder presents a teachable moment for appellate lawyers trying to preserve issues for supreme court review.
Court of appeals frowns strongly at state, declares error harmless
State v. Kyle Lee Monahan, 2014AP2187, 4/27/17, District 4 (not recommended for publication) review granted 11/13/17; Affirmed 6/29/18; case activity (including briefs)
Kyle Monahan was convicted of OWI homicide after a jury trial. The trial court excluded evidence offered to show that Monahan was not, in fact, driving the vehicle when it crashed. On appeal, the state agrees with Monahan that the evidence should have come in, but argues that its exclusion was harmless. The court of appeals agrees with the state.
Court of appeals rejects evidentiary challenges
State v. John A. Augoki, 2016AP231-CR, 4/25/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Augoki raises two claims on appeal of his jury-trial conviction of three sexual assaults: that the jury heard other-acts evidence it should hot have heard (raised here as plain error) and that the court unconstitutionally limited his cross-examination of a state expert. The court of appeals rejects both in a fact-intensive opinion.