On Point: 1. Appeals

State v. Daniel Scott Klinkenberg, 2015AP331-CR, District 4, 11/5/15 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is one of those really fact-specific decisions.  The centerpiece of the State’s case against Klinkenberg for retail theft was security camera footage that did not show him concealing merchandise of leaving the store with unpurchased merchandise. Yet the jury convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Joseph William Netzer, 2015AP213, District 4, 10/29/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

¶1     …. Netzer argues on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial, and that the results of his blood tests were impermissibly admitted into evidence. We conclude that Netzer possessed no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil proceeding,

State v. Mark Alan Tralmer, 2015AP715-CR, District 4, 10/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court’s implicit rejection of Tralmer’s suppression hearing testimony and acceptance of the police officer’s contrary testimony were not clearly erroneous and therefore must be upheld on appeal, State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. Accordingly, the circuit court properly concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Tralmer for violating § 346.05(1) by swerving into the wrong lane of traffic when there is no obstruction requiring the driver to do so, as allowed under § 346.05(1)(d).

State v. E.P., 2015AP1298-1300, 10/1/15, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A jury found grounds to terminate E.P.’s parental rights because his kids were in continuing need of protective services. The court of appeals rejected E.P.’s arguments that § 48.415(2)’s “6 months or longer” period (i.e. the time a child has been placed outside the home per a CHIPS order) begins to run only after he exhausted his appellate rights. The court also declined to order a new trial in the interests of justice.

Percell Dansberry v. Randy Pfister, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-3723, 9/15/15

The judge who took Dansberry’s guilty plea understated the mandatory minimum sentence Dansberry faced, and therefore Dansberry’s plea was not entered with a full understanding of the consequences, as required under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). But the Supreme Court has not held Boykin errors to be structural, so the state court’s rejection of his plea withdrawal motion on harmless error grounds was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Review of an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (copied from the State’s PFR here):

Crimes may be joined in one trial if they are similar or if they are connected as part of a common plan. Here, the court of appeals reversed Salinas’ conviction because it decided allegations that he sexually assaulted his girlfriend’s child, and that he intimidated his girlfriend and her child, were not similar acts or connected as part of a common plan. Is the court of appeals’ decision in conflict with the well-established rule that joinder of charges must be broadly construed?

Improper joinder is subject to harmless error review. Here, the evidence of sexual assault and victim intimidation was overhwleming. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that the joinder of the charges was not harmless?

State v. Lonel L. Johnson, Jr., 2014AP2888-CR, District 3, 9/15/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

High fives for the defense! The domestic abuse repeater enhancer applied to this defendant increased his maximum penalty for the charged offense. Thus, the court of appeals held (and the State conceded) that the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his underlying conduct qualified as an act of domestic abuse. That’s what Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) requires, but it didn’t happen here.  The real win, however, is that for once the State did NOT prevail on its claim of harmless error!!

Mark D. Jensen v. Marc Clements, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1380, 9/8/15, affirming Jensen v. Schwochert, No. 11-C-0803 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013)

At Jensen’s trial for the murder of his wife Julie the State introduced Julie’s handwritten letter to the police, written two weeks before her death, in which she wrote she would never take her life and that her husband should be the suspect if anything should happen to her. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals assumed the admission of the letter violated Jensen’s right to confrontation but found the error harmless. The Seventh Circuit holds that the court of appeals’ decision was an unreasonable application of the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error standard, and that the erroneous admission of the hearsay evidence had a substantial and injurious influence or effect in determining the jury’s verdict, thus satisfying the actual prejudice standard under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

Village of Thiensville v. Conor B. Fisk, 2015AP576-FT, District 2, 8/26/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Sending the opposing party with a copy of a notice of appeal by email attachment satisfied § 800.14(1)‘s requirement that the appellant “giv[e] the municipal judge and other party written notice of appeal within 20 days of the judgment or decision.”

State v. Susan P. Resch, 2015AP51-CR, District 4, 8/20/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

¶2     Resch fails to sufficiently develop any legal argument based on concrete references (much less based on proper citations) to pertinent portions of the record and the application of governing legal authority, and I reject her arguments on that basis. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (court of appeals may decline to review inadequately developed issues). Any other approach would require me to abandon my neutral judicial role by becoming Resch’s advocate.