On Point: 1. Appeals

State v. James Lee Eady, Jr., 2016 WI App 12; case activity (including briefs)

Under the forgiving standard for assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the state managed to introduce enough circumstantial evidence to prove that the bank Eady robbed was “chartered” by a state of the federal government, and therefore was a “financial institution” for purposes of § 943.87.

City of Stevens Point v. Todd P. Beck, 2015AP978, District 4, 12/17/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

State law confers automatic admissibility on the results of blood alcohol tests performed in accord with Wis. Stat. § 343.305, but does the plaintiff’s failure to show compliance with that statute render such results inadmissible?

State v. Davis Kevin Lewis, 2014AP2773-CR, District 1, 12/01/2015 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lewis (whose first name is itself a matter of dispute, (¶1 n.2)) brings three challenges to his conviction after trial; all are rejected.

State v. Cory S. Herrmann, 2015 WI App 97; case activity (including briefs)

In light of the Second Amendment decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), Wisconsin’s prohibition on the possession of a switchblade knife, § 941.24(1), is unconstitutional as applied to a person who possesses a switchblade in his or her own home.

For the 2015 SPD conference, Judge Sankovitz and Attorneys Rob Henak and Melinda Swartz prepared an excellent outline on a problem that plagues many defense lawyers on appeal.  They have a great issue. They win it, but then the court of appeals or supreme court finds the error harmless.  This detailed, well-researched outline walks you through the history of the “harmless error” doctrine and offers ideas for how to beat it in various situations.  

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

In this case the supreme court will address an important issue about the offense of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime, § 948.075(1r). The court of appeals granted McKellips a new trial on a charge under that statute, holding the jury was erroneously instructed to decide whether McKellips’s cell phone constituted a “computerized communication system” when it should have been instructed to decide whether McKellips’s uses of the phone constituted communication via a “computerized communication system.” The supreme court might also address another issue that has implications beyond § 948.075: Namely, whether instructional error that isn’t objected to at trial can be a basis for a new trial in the interest of justice.

State v. Daniel Scott Klinkenberg, 2015AP331-CR, District 4, 11/5/15 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is one of those really fact-specific decisions.  The centerpiece of the State’s case against Klinkenberg for retail theft was security camera footage that did not show him concealing merchandise of leaving the store with unpurchased merchandise. Yet the jury convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Joseph William Netzer, 2015AP213, District 4, 10/29/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

¶1     …. Netzer argues on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial, and that the results of his blood tests were impermissibly admitted into evidence. We conclude that Netzer possessed no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil proceeding,

State v. Mark Alan Tralmer, 2015AP715-CR, District 4, 10/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court’s implicit rejection of Tralmer’s suppression hearing testimony and acceptance of the police officer’s contrary testimony were not clearly erroneous and therefore must be upheld on appeal, State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. Accordingly, the circuit court properly concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Tralmer for violating § 346.05(1) by swerving into the wrong lane of traffic when there is no obstruction requiring the driver to do so, as allowed under § 346.05(1)(d).

State v. E.P., 2015AP1298-1300, 10/1/15, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A jury found grounds to terminate E.P.’s parental rights because his kids were in continuing need of protective services. The court of appeals rejected E.P.’s arguments that § 48.415(2)’s “6 months or longer” period (i.e. the time a child has been placed outside the home per a CHIPS order) begins to run only after he exhausted his appellate rights. The court also declined to order a new trial in the interests of justice.