On Point: 1. Appeals

State v. Robert C. Blankenheim, 2015AP239-CR, District 2, 7/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Blankenheim’s challenges his OAR conviction by arguing that he was unlawfully stopped, that the evidence wasn’t sufficient to prove operation on a highway, and that the police officer wasn’t a credible witness. The court of appeals disagrees “on all points….” (¶1).

State v. Corey R. Kucharski, 2015 WI 64, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Crooks; dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson);  case activity (including briefs)

If you thought defending a discretionary reversal in SCOW was tough before, it just got tougher. Kucharski pled “no contest” to killing his parents but claimed he was not guilty by reason of mental illness due to schizophrenia. Voices told him to commit the murders. He had not been diagnosed with schizophrenia, but 3 doctors supported his NGI defense. The State presented no witnesses, yet the circuit court found that Kucharski failed his burden of proof. The court of appeals granted a new trial in the interests of justice. In a split decision, SCOW reversed and changed the “discretionary reversal” standard.

Questions presented:

1.  Whether the law-of-the-case doctrine requires the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case to be measured against the elements described in the jury instructions where those instructions, without objection, require the government to prove additional or more stringent elements than do the statute and indictment.

2.  Whether a statute-of-limitations defense not raised at or before trial is reviewable on appeal.

Attention appellate practitioners: We are pleased to present this guest post by Andrea Cornwall, Regional Attorney Manager if the SPD’s Milwaukee Appellate Office, about the imminent change in the rules governing references to victims in appellate brief.

Town of Bloomfield v. Petko Zvetkov Barashki, 2015AP226, District 2, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a case the court of appeals aptly describes as “unusual,” the court exercises its discretionary power of reversal under § 752.35 to throw out Barashki’s OWI 1st conviction and refusal finding on the grounds that the evidence doesn’t show the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Barashki.

State v. Lavarren D. Etienne, 2014AP2881-CR, 6/18/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This appeal concerned the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict that Etienne intentionally violated a bond which prohibited him from having contact with “P.J.”  Etienne said the contact was accidental. Due to the deference given to jury findings,  Etienne’s argument failed.  So did his claimed due process violation.

Dunn County v. Dennis M., 2014AP2579, District 3, 6/16/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Despite the fact Dennis M. can’t possess a firearm as a result of a prior involuntary commitment order, his appeal from that order is moot because he entered into a voluntary stipulation to recommitment that has expired and not been renewed.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the evidence presented at Smith’s postconviction hearing establish reason to doubt that Smith was competent at the time of his trial and sentencing under the standard for retrospective determinations of competency established by State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986)?

State v. Arron A.-R., 2014AP142, District 1, 6/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Arron delinquency adjudication for one count of first degree sexual assault is supported by the testimony of the victim, S.F., but the adjudication for a second count is reversed because the trial court erred in believing that the charge required only sexual contact, not sexual intercourse.

State v. Andrew J. Joda, 2014AP1949 & 2014AP1950, District 2, 5/6/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Given the trial court’s conclusion that Deputy Becker’s testimony was more credible than Joda’s testimony, the court factual findings are not clearly erroneous just because there was a discrepancy between Becker’s testimony and his written report and Becker was unable to remember exactly where he was when he saw Joda make an illegal u-turn.