On Point: 1. Appeals

Milwaukee County v. Andy S., 2014AP1885, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to prove dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a., as it showed Andy “[e]vidence[d] a substantial probability of physical harm to himself … as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm.”

State v. Jonathan Thomas, 2014AP543-CR, District 1, 1/5/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

At his trial on a charge of second degree reckless homicide for causing the death of Michael Brown, Thomas claimed Brown accidentally shot himself while handling a gun. The jury found Thomas guilty of the lesser included offense of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 940.08(1). The court of appeals rejects Thomas’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for that verdict.

State v. Bobbie Tanta Bowen, 2015 WI App 12; case activity

Bowen was found guilty of bail jumping for violating the provision of his bail that he have no contact with F.B., the victim of an earlier battery charge, or F.B.’s residence. The court of appeals holds that the trial evidence—which showed Bowen went into F.B.’s residence but had no direct contact with F.B. while he was inside—was sufficient to support the verdict because the bond condition “that [Bowen] not have contact with F.B.” did not require proof that Bowen directly communicated with F.B.

County of Fond du Lac v. Jeffrey K. Krueger, 2014AP1494, District 2, 12/30/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Krueger was stopped by an officer who said Krueger drove his car over the center line. Krueger disputed that and moved to suppress. At the suppression hearing the officer testified and the video from his squad car camera was played. The trial court found the video to be inconclusive and the officer’s testimony to be credible.

State v. John D. Harris, 2014AP1292-CR, District 1, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Harris isn’t entitled to a new trial based on alleged errors in the jury instruction for disorderly conduct, and the evidence is sufficient to support the guilty verdicts for that charge and a charge of battery.

City of Chippewa Falls v. Douglas M. Buchli, 2014AP1422, District 3, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was probable cause to arrest Buchli for OWI despite the fact the police investigation discovered inconsistent information—including an admission by Buchli’s companion, Mahoney, that she was driving.

City of Brookfield v. Cassandra L. Gissal, 2014AP1751-FT, District 2, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

At trial Gissal challenged the admissibility of her statements to police because she wasn’t given Miranda warnings, but the trial court ruled she wasn’t in custody for Miranda purposes. On appeal she abandons this claim and argues instead that allowing the officer to testify to her statements violated her Fifth Amendment privilege and that she wouldn’t have testified at trial if the officer had been barred from relating her statements.

Court of appeals request for certification granted; case activity

Issue (per court of appeals certification)

Whether, under the circumstances of this case, a suffiency of the evidence challenge requires an appellate court to measure the evidence against the instructions the jury received, as the court did in State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), or instead against statutory requirements,

Outagamie v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 12/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Section 51.20(1)(a)2.a authorizes the involuntary commitment of a person who is “dangerous,” a test that may be met by showing recent threats of, or attempts at, suicide. This unanimous decision holds that in the right circumstances just thinking about suicide–without articulating a plan for committing it–constitutes a sufficient “threat” to satisfy the involuntary commitment statute.

State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2015 WI App 4; case activity

A person committed as a sexually violent person under ch. 980 does not have a due process right to have the state prove at a discharge hearing that he is still a sexually violent person, so the clear and convincing evidence standard under § 980.09(3) is not facially unconstitutional.