On Point: 1. Appeals

State v. John D. Harris, 2014AP1292-CR, District 1, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Harris isn’t entitled to a new trial based on alleged errors in the jury instruction for disorderly conduct, and the evidence is sufficient to support the guilty verdicts for that charge and a charge of battery.

City of Chippewa Falls v. Douglas M. Buchli, 2014AP1422, District 3, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was probable cause to arrest Buchli for OWI despite the fact the police investigation discovered inconsistent information—including an admission by Buchli’s companion, Mahoney, that she was driving.

City of Brookfield v. Cassandra L. Gissal, 2014AP1751-FT, District 2, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

At trial Gissal challenged the admissibility of her statements to police because she wasn’t given Miranda warnings, but the trial court ruled she wasn’t in custody for Miranda purposes. On appeal she abandons this claim and argues instead that allowing the officer to testify to her statements violated her Fifth Amendment privilege and that she wouldn’t have testified at trial if the officer had been barred from relating her statements.

Court of appeals request for certification granted; case activity

Issue (per court of appeals certification)

Whether, under the circumstances of this case, a suffiency of the evidence challenge requires an appellate court to measure the evidence against the instructions the jury received, as the court did in State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), or instead against statutory requirements,

Outagamie v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 12/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Section 51.20(1)(a)2.a authorizes the involuntary commitment of a person who is “dangerous,” a test that may be met by showing recent threats of, or attempts at, suicide. This unanimous decision holds that in the right circumstances just thinking about suicide–without articulating a plan for committing it–constitutes a sufficient “threat” to satisfy the involuntary commitment statute.

State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2015 WI App 4; case activity

A person committed as a sexually violent person under ch. 980 does not have a due process right to have the state prove at a discharge hearing that he is still a sexually violent person, so the clear and convincing evidence standard under § 980.09(3) is not facially unconstitutional.

State v. Michael C. Hess, 2014AP268-CR, District 3, 11/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

While the trial evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Hess possessed methamphetamine, Hess is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice because the verdict may have been influenced by evidence offered to proved drugged-driving charges that were dismissed during trial.

State v. Frank M. Zdzieblowski, 2014 WI App 130; case activity

The prosecutor during voir dire elicited a promise from prospective jurors that they would convict if the State proved the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and then reminded the jurors of that promise in his rebuttal closing argument. The court of appeals holds the prosecutor’s unobjected-to voir dire questioning and rebuttal closing argument neither rose to the level of plain error nor warranted a new trial in the interest of justice.

Court of appeals certification request, certification granted 12/18/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 75; case activity

Issue Presented (from Certification)

We certify this case to the supreme court because we are uncertain which of two decisions is controlling: State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), or State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681. The issue is whether, under the circumstances here, a sufficiency of the evidence challenge requires us to measure the evidence against the instructions the jury received, as the court did in Wulff, or instead against statutory requirements, as the court did in Beamon.

State v. Addison F. Steiner, 2013AP2629-CR, district 4, 10/16/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

This case raises an issue that even the court of appeals deemed to be of first impression. Does §948.20, which criminalizes abandonment of a child, require an intent to abandon a child permanently, or is leaving a child alone for 1 or 2 hours enough?  If the latter, then how is “child abandonment” different from “child neglect” under §948.21? The court of appeals refused to address the issue for reasons that should trouble anyone challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict.