On Point blog, page 53 of 117
Court scolds State for shoddy advocacy, holds alleged “stop” was actually an arrest without probable cause
State v. Thomas J. Anker, 2014 WI App 107; case activity
If a conservation warden shouted “you’re under arrest,” ordered you to stop walking, forcibly handcuffed you, and restrained you in his car until he could turn you over to investigating authorities, would you think you were under arrest or simply “temporarily detained”? The State, with a straight face, claimed these facts showed a Terry stop. The court of appeals, with a stern tone, rebuked the State and sharply criticized its brief.
Postconviction counsel may raise defendant’s competence to stand trial though trial court and trial counsel had no such concerns
State v. Jimmie Lee Smith, 2014 WI App 98, petition for review granted 6/12/15; case activity
If you’re working on a competency issue, read this decision. Neither the trial court nor defense counsel raised the subject of Smith’s competency at the time of trial. And Smith had not received a pre-trial competency exam. That’s why the postconviction court rejected Smith’s claim that he was incompetent at the time of trial. There was no contemporaneous evidence to support it. The court of appeals reversed, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial.
Joinder of sexual assault claims and admission of evidence showing change in victim’s personality upheld
State v. John M. Lattimore, 2013AP911-CR, District 4, 9/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Lattimore was convicted of 2nd-degree sexual assault with use of force and false imprisonment against S.M. He appealed trial court decisions to: (1) join a count of 3rd-degree sexual assault against a different victim, M.H., to S.M.’s trial, (2) exclude the text of a Facebook message sent by S.M.’s brother to the defendant right after the assault, and (3) admit testimony about S.M.’s personality change after the assault. He had no luck with the court of appeals.
Court lost competency in ch. 51 case because probable cause hearing occurred beyond 72-hour time limit
Waukesha County v. Steven R.C., 2014AP1032-FT, District 2, 9/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The failure to hold a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of Steven’s initial detention deprived the circuit court of competency to proceed, despite the County’s filing of a new petition within the 72-hour time period with new allegations.
Pro se defendant’s appellate arguments too undeveloped to address
State v. James E. Grant, 2013AP1829-CR & 2013AP1830-CR, District 4, 9/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1829-CR; 2013AP1830-CR
Two of the three arguments made in Grant’s appellate brief were sufficiently stated to survive the state’s motion to strike, but they are ultimately too undeveloped to address under State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, Grant failed to arrange for the production of the transcript of the circuit court’s oral ruling on his postconviction motion, meaning the transcript is assumed to support the circuit court’s decision, State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶5 n.1, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 774.
Any error in admitting expert testimony in CHIPS case was harmless
State v. Eugene P., 2014AP361, 2014AP362 & 2014AP363, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP361; 2014AP362; 2014AP363
Allowing a doctor to testify at a CHIPS trial that the children’s injuries were the result of abuse was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
Ch. 51 appeal is moot
Milwaukee County v. Rebecca G., 2014AP359, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rebecca’s appeal of her ch. 51 commitment is dismissed as moot because the six-month commitment order expired while the appeal was pending and the County didn’t seek an extension.
Time for holding probable cause hearing under § 51.20(7)(a) runs from time of arrival at hosptial, not mental health unit within hospital
Ozaukee County v. Mark T.J., 2014AP479, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The failure to hold an initial hearing within 72 hours of Mark’s arrival at the hospital where he was detained deprived the circuit court of competency to order an initial commitment order under ch. 51. But his appeal from that initial commitment order is moot because he stipulated to recommitment and vacating the initial commitment would have no practical effect.
SCOW: Error harmless, trial counsel not ineffective
State v. James R. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, 8/1/14, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity
The court of appeals granted Hunt a new trial; the supreme court takes that new trial away. The supreme court’s decision does not develop any new law or address a novel issue of statewide concern—and that’s no surprise, for as described here, the state’s petition for review admitted the case didn’t meet the usual standards for review. Instead, the court applies well-developed rules governing harmless error and ineffective assistance of counsel to the fact-specific claims in this case. In the course of doing so, however, the court misunderstands, ignores, or inverts some fundamental tenets of appellate review and basic rules of evidence.
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for not moving to strike testimony of witness who invoked the privilege against self-incrimination
State v. Matthew D. Campbell, 2011AP1445-CR, District 4, 7/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
After a victim admitted during cross-examination that she lied under oath during direct examination, the trial court advised the victim of her right against self-incrimination. (¶3-4). She invoked that right and was given immunity under §§ 972.08 and 972.085. (¶4). Cross-examination resumed, yielding additional admissions by the victim that she lied or gave inconsistent statements. (¶¶5-6). Under these circumstances, trial counsel was not ineffective for not moving to strike the victim’s direct examination testimony.