On Point

Racine County v. D.S. 2025AP758-FT, 8/6/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity

COA rejects a battery of challenges to D.S.’s involuntary commitment and medication despite sharing some of the examining physician’s “concerns” about her situation.

Washburn County v. L.R.Y., 2025AP272-FT, District 3, 7/22/25 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Lily” appeals an original commitment and involuntary med order, arguing that the circuit court violated her right to have the County’s fact witnesses testify in person. COA agrees that, under Wis. Stat. § 885.60(2)(d), the circuit court erred by failing to sustain Lily’s objection to the county’s fact witnesses appearing by video at the final hearing.

Pierce County v. P.C.A., 2024AP1367, 7/1/25, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity

While affirming the circuit court continuing a protective placement order under Chapter 55 after a due process hearing (known as a Watts hearing), the COA clarified that, following previous due process hearings, documentary evidence that was admitted, and testimony that was accepted by the circuit court and incorporated into its findings, may be considered at subsequent due process hearings. 

Waukesha County v. J.A.K., 2024AP2535, 6/25/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity

In yet another Chapter 51 appeal, COA rejects the usual arguments and affirms.

Outagamie County v. M.J.B., 2024AP250, 5/20/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity

In a case clarifying a legal question that has persisted for years in 51 litigation, COA holds that when the examiners do not satisfy the statutorily-imposed deadline for filing their reports in connection with a final hearing in an original commitment proceeding, the circuit court can lose competency.

Fond du Lac County v. D.P.E., 2025AP66-FT, 4/30/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

COA affirms the circuit court’s orders recommitting D.P.E. (referred to as “Donald”) and authorizing the involuntarily administration of medication. Donald argued on appeal that the county did not present sufficient evidence to establish dangerousness and failed to meet its burden to prove he was not competent to refuse medication.

Winnebago County v. J.D.M., 2024AP1601, 4/16/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

COA affirms the circuit court’s orders recommitting J.D.M. (referred to as “Josh”) for twelve months and authorizing involuntarily administering medication. A jury found Josh mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous to himself or others. Josh argues on appeal that the county did not present sufficient evidence at trial to prove that he was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., d., or e, and the court made insufficient findings to enter the involuntary medication order.

Winnebago County v. J.M., 2024AP1554, 4/2/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

COA affirmed the circuit court’s order recommitting J.M. (referred to as “James Moore”) for twelve months and authorizing involuntarily administering medication.  The Court found that Moore suffers from schizoaffective disorder, which caused him to drink an excessive amount of water to the point that he needed to be transported to the emergency room for low sodium levels in his body.  The Court therefore found that Moore is a danger to himself, and that he is a proper subject for treatment because his condition is treatable with medication.

Winnebago County v. J.S., 2024AP1333, 3/5/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

In yet another case testing the applicability of SCOW’s D.J.W. mandate, COA finds that the circuit court “barely” satisfied those requirements and affirms.

Monroe County v. M.C., 2024AP924, 12/12/24, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s commitment order under Chapter 51 where the court did not make sufficient factual findings to support its conclusion that M.C. was dangerous, as required by D.J.W.