On Point: a. Constitutional challenges

Sheboygan County v. N.A.L., 2024AP1195, 2/5/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); petition for review granted 5/21/25 case activity

In yet another appeal asking COA to clarify the procedure for accepting a stipulation to a mental commitment, COA refuses N.A.L.’s invitation to issue a precedential opinion and affirms based largely on a prior unpublished decision.

Winnebago County v. W.I., 2022AP2095, 08/30/2023, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In addition to the two court ordered psycholigical examinations required under § 51.20(9)(a)1., subdivision 3 provides individual’s subject to potential involuntary civil commitment “a right” to an additional psychological examination. See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(9)(a)3. If requested, the cost of the examination is either (1) at the individual’s expense  or (2) “if indigent and with approval of the court hearing the petition, at the reasonable expense of the individual’s county of legal residence…” As a matter of first impression, the court of appeals holds that individuals seeking such an evaluation must satisfy an implied and unspecified burden of proof to establish indigency before the individual may obtain an additional examination at county expense. (Op., ¶¶8-9).

Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022 WI App 36; case activity

On April 12th the court of appeals issued an opinion holding that due process does not require a county to give particularized notice of the standard of dangerousness that a person will satisfy if treatment is withdrawn. It also found that special verdict given to the jury defective. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on a recommitment that had expired. Happy news! The court of appeals withdrew that opinion. The reissued opinion omits the due process decision, retains the special verdict win, and now reverses outright.

Trempealeau County v. B.K., 2020AP1166, District 3, 7/27/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

B.K. (“Brian”) argues he was denied procedural due process because he was not given particularized notice of which standard of dangerousness the County intended to prove at the final commitment hearing. He also contends the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to prove he was dangerous. The court of appeals rejects with both claims.

Adams County v. D.R.D., 2020AP1426, 1/28/21, District 4; case activity

This appeal posed a simple question about due process in a Chapter 51 commitment proceeding. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) held that the 14th Amendment requires the county to give a person sufficient notice of the legal standard under which she is being detained so that she has a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense. D.R.D. raised this issue on appeal but since trial counsel had not preserved the objection, the court of appeals held the issue forfeited.

Winnebago County v. C.S., 2020 WI 33,  reversing a published court of appeals opinion; 4/10/20; case activity

This is a BIG case for Chapter 51 lawyers! In a 4-3 opinion, SCOW held that when a court commits a prison inmate under Chapter 51, it cannot order involuntary medication without finding the inmate dangerous first. The decision changes trial procedure for inmates commitments, but also has implications for the involuntary medication of non-inmates under  Chapter 51.

Monroe County v. D.J., 2019AP1133, 1/2/19, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Oh, this issue again. Monroe County pursued a Chapter 51 original commitment against D.J. but didn’t say which of the 5 standards of dangerousness it was proceeding under. One doctor opined that commitment was warranted under the 1st or 2nd standards. The other doctor specified 2nd or 5th standards. The trial court instructed the jury on all 3 standards. D.J.’s trial counsel didn’t object. And the jury found commitment warranted.

Sauk County v. R.A.S., 2018AP2253, 10/31/2019, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.A.S. was committed after a ch. 51 jury trial. The county alleged and the court instructed on two forms of dangerousness–those in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and 2.d.. R.A.S. asked that the verdict form require the jury to agree on one, the other, or both to commit him, but the circuit court refused, instead submitting a form that just asked the jury if R.A.S. was “dangerous.” The court of appeals now affirms this decision, rejecting R.A.S.’s due-process claim and saying that In re Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 359 Wis. 2d 272, 856 N.W.2d 603, controls the question–though it in fact has only glancing relevance to the issue.

Milwaukee County v. D.C.B., 2018AP987, District 1, 5/14/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects D.C.B.’s constitutional and procedural challenges to the extension of his ch. 51 commitment.

Ozaukee County v. R.T.H., 2018AP1317, 2/27/19, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity; Marathon County v. C.M.L., 2017AP2220, 2/26/19, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

These two, unrelated decisions highlight a recurring due process violation at Chapter 51 hearings. For an original commitment, the county must prove that the person is “dangerous” under 1 of 5 standards of dangerousness. §51.20(1)(a)2.a-e. Some counties don’t bother identifying any particular standard of dangerousness before or during the hearing. Others give notice of one standard and then prove a different standard of dangerousness at the hearing. Makes it hard to prepare a defense, no?