On Point: Defense wins!

Monroe County v. M.C., 2024AP924, 12/12/24, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s commitment order under Chapter 51 where the court did not make sufficient factual findings to support its conclusion that M.C. was dangerous, as required by D.J.W.

St. Croix County v. B.T.C., 2023AP2085, 6/11/24, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In the second decision this week reversing a circuit court’s commitment order under Chapter 51, the COA concludes that respondent telling a police officer that he would “bring the chief to justice” not sufficient to establish the respondent is “dangerous.”

Marinette County v. C.R.J., 2023AP1695-FT, 4/16/24, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

C.R.J. (“Caleb”) challenged his commitment on two fronts: (1) the circuit court’s failure to comply with Langlade County v. D.J.W.’s “specific factual findings” mandate and (2) the county failed to introduce sufficient evidence of dangerousness under either standard. After critiquing the circuit court’s factual findings, the court agrees with Caleb that insufficient evidence existed to involuntarily commit him.

Dane County v. D.F.B., 2022AP1852, District 4, 05/11/2023 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A jury found D.F.B. dangerous under the second standard, which required evidence of a “substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals as manifested … by evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm.” See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. At trial, two witnesses testified about threats D.F.B. allegedly made by email to a University of Wisconsin-Madison employee. The circuit court overruled D.F.B.’s objection that the testimony was not the “best evidence” of the contents of the emails. The court of appeals disagrees, holding that the circuit court admitted testimony about the contents of D.F.B.’s alleged emails contrary to Wis. Stat. § 910.02 and that the error was not harmless. (Opinion, ¶¶ 1-2). 

Trempealeau County v. C.B.O., 2021AP1955 & 2022AP102, 8/30/22, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a double defense win! You might even call it a quadruple defense win! The court of appeals consolidated “Chris’s” appeals from his initial commitment order and his recommitment order. It reversed his initial commitment order because (1) the circuit court violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient. It reversed the recommitment order because (3) the circuit court’s fact findings were clearly erroneous, and (4) all the county proved was that if treatment were withdrawn Chris would engage in the same conduct that was insufficient to support the initial commitment.

Milwaukee County v. A.J.G., 2021AP1338, 5/3/22, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

When a circuit court orders a ch. 51 recommitment, it must specify which standard of dangerousness the patient will satisfy if treatment is withdrawn. Langlade County. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 941 N.W.2d 277. This case holds that a circuit court must also specify the standard of dangerousness that the patient meets when ordering an initial commitment.

Milwaukee County v. Cheri V., 2012AP1737, District 1, 12/18/12

 court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Mental health commitment, § 51.20, requires proof of mental illness and dangerousness. Cheri V. limits this challenge to the latter; the court agrees:

¶7        As seen from our recitation of the facts adduced at the trial, however, there is absolutely no evidence that any of the statutory prerequisites were met—yelling at and pointing a finger at another person,