On Point blog, page 2 of 4

Defense win! Evidence insufficient for 3rd standard recommitment

Marathon County v. T.R.H., 2022AP1394, 3/14/23, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Counties often seek recommitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c, the third standard of dangerousness. It is the easiest standard to satisfy–especially at the recommitment stage. But not this time. The court of appeals held that the county can’t just offer testimony that, at some point in the past, the person failed to care for himself, experienced delusions, and struggled with social interactions when not on medication.  The county’s evidence must be more specific.

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Evidence at recommitment hearing established mental illness and dangerousness under 3rd standard

Waukesha County v. G.M.M., 2022AP1207, 1/18/23, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This appeal involves a recommitment under the 3rd standard of dangerousness. G.M.M. argued that the county presented insufficient evidence of both mental illness and dangerousness. She also argued that the circuit court failed to make the findings required under Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶59, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.  The court of appeals rejected all 3 claims.

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Recommitment based on 3rd standard of dangerousness upheld

Winnebago County v. J.D.J., 2022AP1357-FT, 11/23/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

J.D.J. has schizophrenia. At his recommitment hearing, Dr. Monese testified that if treatment were withdrawn, he would become a proper subject of commitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c. J.D.J. does not believe he has a mental illness, so he would stop treatment and become “violent.” Third-standard recommitments are increasingly common. This decision highlights the need for more vigorous defense strategies in these cases.

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Another 3rd standard recommitment affirmed

Sauk County v. A.D.S., 2022AP550, 11/17/22, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court recommitted A.D.S. based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c, which seems to be the standard du jour for ch. 51 recommitments.  Even though A.D.S. hadn’t recently behaved dangerously, the court of appeals affirmed because recommitments may be based on past evidence of dangerousness, and credible evidence indicated that if not committed he would stop taking his medication and return to his former dangerous behavior.

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Defense win! Another ch. 51 recommitment tossed for insufficient evidence of dangerousness

Marathon County v. T.J.M., 2022AP623, 11/8/22, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Trevor” appealed an order recommitting him for 12 months because (1) the circuit court orally failed to indicate a standard of dangeorusness per Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient under either the 1st or 3rd standards. He prevailed on the latter argument. The opinion is helpful to lawyers defending clients against recommitment under these standards.

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Evidence at final ch. 51 commitment hearing established dangerousness

Sheboygan County HSD v. P.W.S., 2022AP426, District 2, 9/28/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In this fact-intensive decision (¶¶2-17), the court of appeals rejects P.W.S.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that there was a substantial probability he was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

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Defense wins! Initial commitment and recommitment reversed due to D.J.W. and evidentiary errors

Trempealeau County v. C.B.O., 2021AP1955 & 2022AP102, 8/30/22, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a double defense win! You might even call it a quadruple defense win! The court of appeals consolidated “Chris’s” appeals from his initial commitment order and his recommitment order. It reversed his initial commitment order because (1) the circuit court violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. and (2) the county’s evidence was insufficient. It reversed the recommitment order because (3) the circuit court’s fact findings were clearly erroneous, and (4) all the county proved was that if treatment were withdrawn Chris would engage in the same conduct that was insufficient to support the initial commitment.

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Defense win! COA finds evidence insufficient for recommitment

Portage County v. C.K.S., 2021AP1291-FT, 11/24/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court recommitted C.K.S. but apparently neglected to specify the applicable standard(s) of dangerousness. C.K.S. appealed arguing that the court violated D.J.W. and that the county’s evidence of dangerousness was insufficient. The court of appeals declined to address the D.J.W. error. Instead, it reviewed the county’s evidence of dangerousness and held it insufficient under the only standards that could apply: the 1st, 3rd, and 4th standards.

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Evidence sufficient to prove elements of ch. 51 commitment

Outagamie County v. D.G.M., 2020AP967, District 3, 9/21/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence at the final hearing on the petition to commit D.G.M. under ch. 51 was sufficient to establish all the statutory elements and D.G.M.’s incompetence to refuse medication.

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COA reverses ch. 51 recommitment of person under ch. 55 protective placement

Outagamie County v. X.Z.B., 2020AP2058, 6/22/2121, District 3, (1 judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This case involves the recommitment of a protectively placed person based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c., the 3rd standard of dangerousness.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit courts’ recommitment order for insufficient evidence. And, for the second time in one week, it held that when circuit courts fail to make the requisite factual findings for a commitment that has expired, the remedy is reversal not remand for further fact-finding.

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